摘要
以项目唯一性条款为研究对象,从新建竞争性道路对既有高速公路PPP项目收益的影响方面入手选取参数,通过构建数理模型对项目的竞争性道路进行量化界定,并用算例对该模型的适用性进行了检验。研究发现,可以通过在特许权合同的唯一性条款中设定竞争性道路的最小里程来保障社会资本方的利益,同时使得政府与社会资本方在唯一性条款的谈判中有相应的定量指导依据。
Taking the project uniqueness clause as the research object,this paper selects parameters from the impact of new competitive roads on the revenue of existing expressway PPP projects,defines the competitive roads quantitatively by building a mathematical model,and tests the applicability of the model with a numerical exarmple.Results show that the minimum mileage of competitive road can be set in the uniqueness clause of concession contract to protect the interests of social capital parties,and at the same time,the government and social capital parties can have corresponding quantitative guidance in the negotiation of uniqueness clause.
作者
赵立力
范怡雪
ZHAO Li-li;FAN Yi-xue(Schoo of Public Administration,Southuest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031)
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第1期130-134,共5页
Soft Science