论康德对先验自由可能性的证明——以“第三个二律背反”为中心

On Kant’s Proof of the Possibility of Transcendental Freedom——A Discussion Based on the“Third Antinomy”

康德在“第三个二律背反”中主张自由与自然因果决定论是相容的,本文在这一框架内考察康德对先验自由可能性的证明。通行的解释不区分逻辑的与实在的可能性,笼统地认为康德证明了先验自由的可能性。这种做法不能准确地展示出康德在理论哲学领域对自由所做的证明工作,也不能凸显出这种证明在康德的整个哲学体系中的基础性地位。在解决第三个二律背反的过程中,康德所成功地证明的只是无矛盾地思维先验自由的可能性,即逻辑的可能性。这种证明既是解决理性自身冲突的需要,也是确立道德法则的需要。在思辨领域,康德对先验自由逻辑的可能性的证明是凭借先验观念论而实现的。先验自由实在的可能性,只有在道德实践领域诉诸对道德法则的意识才能够得到证明。

In the“Third Antinomy”Kant claims that freedom and causal determinism are compatible.This article examines Kant’s proof of the possibility of transcendental freedom in the framework of the Third Antinomy.A common interpretation holds the view that Kant has proved the possibility of transcendental freedom without distinguishing between the logical and the real possibility.This interpretation cannot accurately display Kant’s working on the proof of freedom in the field of theoretical philosophy,nor can it highlight the fundamental role of the proof in Kant’s entire system of philosophy.In the process of resolving the Third Antinomy,what Kant successfully proves is the possibility of thinking transcendental freedom without contradiction,i.e.,the logical possibility.This proof is not only the need to resolve the conflict of reason itself,but also the need to establish moral laws.In the speculative field of reason,Kant proves that transcendental freedom is logically possible by appealing to transcendental idealism.The real possibility of transcendental freedom can only be proved by virtue of the awareness of the moral law in the field of practical reason.