多个“国家队股东”与企业技术创新——基于准财政政策视角

Multiple‘National Team Shareholders’With Enterprise Technological Innovation:Based on a Quasi-Fiscal Policy Perspective

多个“国家队股东”的结构安排可以稳定企业预期,激励创新资源高质量配置。基于此,本文使用2006—2019年中国A股上市企业数据,检验多个“国家队股东”,即多个社保基金投资组合持股对企业技术创新的影响。研究发现,多个“国家队股东”能够促进企业技术创新,其与财政政策呈现出协同作用,具有准财政政策效应;机制检验证明,这种效应是通过加大人力资本投入和研发资本投入作为中介路径来实现的;此外,研究还发现投资模式、投资持股比例的差异均会产生异质性影响。本文对社保基金优化投资管理人绩效目标、实现准财政政策与财政政策的协同作用具有政策价值,对企业抢抓政策红利以实现高质量发展具有参考价值。

The structure arrangement of multiple‘National Team Shareholders’can stabilize enterprise expectations and encourage high-quality allocation of innovative resources.Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed enterprises from 2006 to 2019,this paper examines the impact of multiple‘national team shareholders’,namely multiple portfolios of social security fund,on enterprise technological innovation.This paper finds that multiple‘National Team Shareholders’can promote enterprise technological innovation.It has synergistic effect with fiscal policy,which indicates that it has quasi-fiscal policy effect.Mechanism test shows that this effect is realized through increasing human capital input and R&D capital input as the intermediary path.In addition,this paper also finds that the difference of both investment pattern and shareholding ratio have heterogeneous effects.This paper has policy value for social security fund to optimize the performance objectives of investment managers and achieve close coordination between quasi-fiscal policy and fiscal policy,and has reference value for helping enterprises to seize the policy dividends and achieve high-quality development.