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社会学习心理与政企协作影响下的信访冲突演化博弈模型 被引量:1

The Evolutionary Game Model of Petition Conflict Under the Influence of Social Learning Psychology and Government-Enterprise Collaboration
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摘要 信访是具有中国特色的社会治理制度创新,经济社会快速发展对信访制度提出了新的要求和挑战.当前围绕信访制度和信访冲突的研究以学理分析和案例研究为主,缺乏对信访冲突微观作用机制的研究,文章从上访者群体的社会学习心理、政府部门与企业的协作两个视角出发,运用演化博弈模型分析了不同主体行为策略的演进过程,讨论揭示了信访冲突的内部影响机制.研究结果表明:上访者群体内部的社会学习心理会对其行为产生重要的影响,学习效率源于信访成本收益的权衡与比较,进而影响企业与上访者间的动态博弈过程;上访者会期望通过非理性信访行为引起政府和公众的关注,揭示企业违规处理行为,获取相应的补偿收益;政府部门介入信访冲突问题能够引导企业和上访者行为向“企业合规经营,上访者理性上访”良性互动转变.同时,信访冲突问题也反映了信访制度内部存在的不足.因此,探索政府参与下的多主体信访冲突治理机制是缓解信访矛盾,提升信访治理效能的重要措施. Complaint reporting is a social governance system innovation with Chinese characteristics,and rapid economic and social development has put forward new requirements and challenges to the petition system.The current research around the petition system and petition conflict is dominated by theoretical analysis and case studies,and few research focuses on the micro-action mechanism of petition conflict.In this paper,we analyze the evolutionary process of behavioral strategies of different subjects from two perspectives:the social learning psychology of petitioner groups and the collaboration between government departments and enterprises,and discuss and reveal the internal influence mechanism of petition conflicts.The results show that:The social learning psychology within the petitioners’ group has an important influence on their behavior,and the learning efficiency comes from the trade-off and comparison of the costs and benefits of petitions,which in turn affects the dynamic game process between enterprises and petitioners;the petitioners expect to draw the attention of the government and the public through their irrational petition behavior,reveal the irregularities of enterprises and obtain corresponding compensation benefits;the involvement of government departments in the petition conflict issue can guide the behavior of enterprises and petitioners to a benign interaction of "enterprises operating in compliance and petitioners petitioning rationally".At the same time,the problem of petition conflict also reflects the inadequacy of the internal petition system.Therefore,exploring a multi-body petition conflict management mechanism with government participation is an important measure to alleviate petition conflicts and improve the effectiveness of petition management.
作者 李雪红 张学云 周嘉祺 张国兴 LI Xuehong;ZHANG Xueyun;ZHOU Jiaqi;ZHANG Guoxing(State Grid Gansu Electric Power Company,Lanzhou 730000;Institute of Green Finance,Lanzhou University,Lanzhou 730000)
出处 《系统科学与数学》 CSCD 北大核心 2022年第12期3306-3320,共15页 Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences
基金 兰州大学中央高校基本科研业务费项目(21lzujbkydx057)资助课题。
关键词 信访冲突 演化博弈 社会学习心理 政企协作 Petition conflict evolutionary game social learning psychology government-enterprise collaboration
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