基于微分博弈的流域水污染治理研究

Research on River Basin Water Pollution Control Based on Differential Game

为提高流域水污染治理效率,构建水污染治理长效机制,论文以污染企业生产技术清洁化进步为切入点,通过建立微分博弈模型,探讨现有生态补偿机制下流域生产技术进步与水污染治理之间的关系,以期为流域水污染治理和生态补偿机制的完善提供建议。研究表明:(1)污染企业生产技术清洁化进步能够降低流域水污染物的存量;(2)加强府际间的合作能够以更少的投入换来更清洁的水环境,同时能够增加流域整体的净收益水平;(3)技术溢出效应对省域生产技术水平、生产技术投资数额及消费品产量有负面影响。

In order to improve the efficiency of water pollution control in the basin and build a long-term mechanism for water pollution control,this paper takes the clean progress of the production technology of polluting enterprises as the breakthrough point,and discusses the progress of production technology and water pollution control in the basin under the existing ecological compensation mechanism by establishing a differential game model.In order to provide suggestions for the improvement of water pollution control and ecological compensation mechanism in the basin.Studies have shown that:(1)Cleaner production technology of polluting enterprises can reduce the stock of water pollutants in the river basin;(2)Strengthening of intergovernmental cooperation can exchange less investment for a cleaner water environment,and at the same time increase the overall net income level of the river basin;(3)The technology spillover effect has a negative impact on the provincial production technology level,the amount of production technology investment and the output of consumer goods.