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“隐性控制”下的垂直管理部门自主性研究——兼论垂直管理下政府间条块关系的嬗变 被引量:4

Autonomy of Vertical Department under Implicit Control:A Transmutation of the Intergovernmental Relationship between Tiao-Kuai Relation in the Context of Vertical Management
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摘要 不同于“双重领导”机构受地方政府干预,既有研究认为“单一领导”的垂直管理机构设立的目标是保持组织运作的独立性。然而,垂直管理机构下级有时在上级与地方政府发生目标冲突时选择违背上级而服从地方政府,垂直管理机构下级的这一反常行为应当如何解释?这引出了本文的核心关切:垂直管理机构下级的行动边界在哪里?在垂管“下级服从上级”的背景下,如何系统性解释垂管下级的“自主性”行为?研究发现,垂直管理机构与地方政府同时影响垂直管理机构下级。垂直管理机构遵循行政逻辑,地方政府遵循行政逻辑与政治逻辑,两者逻辑的排列组合影响垂直管理机构下级的行为。文章提出一个解释:垂直管理机构下级的行为可分为传统型、类传统型和反传统型三种模式,三种模式是其面对“行政逻辑”与“政治逻辑”的策略性选择。一般而言,既有研究认为垂直管理机构“下级服从上级”表现为传统型或类传统型的模式,而垂直管理机构下级有时会出现遵循地方政府的反传统型行为模式,地方政府对于垂直管理机构下级的“隐性控制”是垂直管理机构下级遵循其逻辑的关键。文章以V海关检验检疫变迁为例,通过阐述V海关各阶段检验检疫的运作展现垂直管理机构下级面对垂直管理机构与地方政府的策略选择。作为垂直管理的典型案例,海关的案例意味着不同垂管程度的“下级违背上级”可能在其他垂直管理机构存在。由此,文章提出的解释逻辑为理解垂直管理制度以及政府间条块关系提供了新拓展。 Existing studies suggest that the target of vertical management departments is to ensure the independence of department operation,in short,"subordinate to superior".Whereas,subordinates of vertical management departments sometimes choose to disobey their superiors and obey the local governments when the goals of their superiors and the local governments conflict.How to explain this abnormal behavior of subordinates?This leads to the core concerns of this paper:Where are the operational boundaries of the subordinates?In the background of"subordinate to superior",how to systematically explain the"autonomous"behavior of subordinates?It is found that both the superiors of vertical management departments and local governments have influences on the subordinates of vertical management departments.Furthermore,vertical management departments follow administrative logic,and local governments follow administrative logic and political logic.The permutation and combination of the two logics affects the behavior of subordinates of vertical management departments.Based on the new institutionalism,this article puts forward an explanation logic:The behavior of subordinates in vertical management departments could be divided into traditional,quasi-traditional and anti-traditional modes.Different modes are their independent choices in the face of administrative logic and political logic.To further explain the differences above,this article is based on the case of inspection and quarantine of V Customs in four stages,and shows the choice of subordinate when facing its superior of vertical management department and local government.In principle,existing studies suggest that"subordinate to superior"in vertical management departments manifest traditional mode or quasi-traditional mode.However,the subordinates of vertical management sometimes appear to follow local governments’anti-traditional mode.This article shows that the"guarantee"of local governments for the subordinates of vertical management departments is the key that makes the subordinates of vertical managements to follow local governments’logic.In addition,the explanation logic is tested by the typical case of V Customs which may exist in other vertical management.It provides new supplements to understand the Intergovernmental relationship between Tiao-kuai relation.
作者 凌争 吴金兴 Ling Zheng;Wu Jinxin(Zhou Enlai School of Government,Nankai University,Tianjin,300381,China)
出处 《公共管理学报》 北大核心 2023年第1期31-45,170,171,共17页 Journal of Public Management
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(22YJC810004) 国家自然科学基金面上项目(72074129) 南开大学亚洲研究中心资助研究课题(AS2221)。
关键词 垂直管理 行政逻辑 政治逻辑 海关检验检疫 条块关系 Vertical Management Administrative Logic Political Logic Customs Quarantine Tiao-Kuai Relation
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