自主创新还是技术引进:业绩型股权激励与企业创新策略

Make or buy: Performance-vested equity incentives and firm innovation strategy

本文基于我国2010–2019年高科技企业数据,按照自主创新与技术引进的相对比例关系衡量企业创新策略,实证检验了业绩型股权激励行权业绩条件对企业创新策略的影响.结果显示,行权业绩条件越严格,企业越倾向于选择技术引进策略.对股权激励契约条款交互作用的研究发现,股权激励的强度越大、行权有效期越短以及授予限制性股票的上市公司更能发挥行权业绩条件对技术引进策略的促进作用.进一步研究指出,业绩型股权激励对企业创新策略的影响在信息不对称水平高、代理问题严重、两权分离度高的企业中更显著.本文研究拓展了最优契约理论,分析了高管选择不同创新策略的内在逻辑,丰富了业绩型股权激励经济后果的相关文献,也为高科技企业优化股权激励方案、激发企业自主创新活力提供了政策建议和现实启示.

Based on the data of China’s high-tech firm from 2010 to 2019, we measure the innovation strategy implemented by firm according to the relative proportion between independent innovation and technology import, and empirically test the impact of performance-vested equity incentives on firm innovation strategy. The results show that the more stringent the performancevesting conditions are, the more firm tend to choose the technology import strategy. The study on the interaction of contractual terms of equity incentives found that the greater the intensity of equity incentives, the shorter the exercise validity and the listed firm that grant restricted stock can play a better role in promoting the technology import strategy. Further research points out that the impact of performance-vested equity incentives on firm innovation strategy is stronger in firm with high level of information asymmetry, serious agency problem and high separation of two rights. This paper expands the optimal contract theory, analyzes the internal logic of senior management choosing different innovation strategies, enriches the relevant literature on the economic consequences of performance-vested equity incentives, and also provides policy suggestions and practical enlightenment for high-tech firm to optimize equity incentives and drive independent innovation.