信用多重约束下供应链企业间动态古诺博弈的非线性演化研究

Nonlinear evolution of dynamic Cournot game among supply chain enterprises under multiple credit constraints

对经济系统中古诺寡头博弈及其均衡状态的非线性动态演化问题研究一直备受学术界关注,而信用的多重约束已成为影响现代企业稳定发展的关键,对寡头企业博弈行为及其稳定性产生重要影响.鉴于此,本文考虑了下游企业信用违约、银行信贷意愿与银行信贷风险偏好差异性等信用多重约束影响,构建了信用多重约束下上游寡头企业产量决策的动态古诺双寡头模型,将非线性动力学理论方法与古诺博弈相结合,系统解析了多重信用约束对两个上游寡头企业动态产量博弈均衡稳定性的影响及古诺-纳什均衡非线性演化特征.通过理论推导和仿真模拟研究发现:1)下游企业信用违约、银行信贷意愿和银行风险偏好差别程度的增大对产量决策古诺-纳什均衡起到稳定作用,且三者的影响程度依次递减;2)银行风险偏好差别程度增大会改变双寡头竞争形势,可能造成混沌状态下单寡头垄断形成;3)下游企业信用违约和银行信贷意愿的波动频率增大能抑制混沌行为,但不利于古诺-纳什均衡的稳定.

The research on the nonlinear dynamic evolution of Cournot duopoly game and its equilibrium state in the economic system has been paid much attention by the academic circles, while the multiple constraints of credit have become the key to the stable development of modern enterprises, and have an important impact on the game behavior and stability of enterprises. In view of this, this article considers the multiple constraints on credit such as downstream enterprises’ credit default, bank loan willingness and bank credit risk appetites,to build the upstream duopolies output decision dynamic Cournot duopoly model under the multiple credit constraints. Combining the nonlinear dynamic theory and Cournot game, the influence of multiple credit constraints on the equilibrium stability of two upstream duopolies’ dynamic output game and the evolution characteristics of Cournot-Nash equilibrium are analyzed systematically. Through theoretical derivation and simulation research, it is found that: 1) The increase of downstream enterprises’ credit default, bank loan willingness and the gap between bank credit risk appetites has a stabilizing effect on the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of output decision, and the degree of influence of the three decreases in turn;2) The increase of the gap between bank credit risk appetites will result in the oligopoly under the chaotic state;3)The increase of fluctuation frequency of downstream enterprises’ credit default and bank loan willingness can restrain chaotic behavior, but it is not conducive to the stability of Cournot-Nash equilibrium.