公募基金投资顾问监管逻辑重构:以销售佣金为中心

Restructuring the Regulatory Logic for Regulating Mutual Fund Advisers: Focusing on Commissions

《资管新规》致力于拨乱反正,但未涉及大资管回归本源后的重要一环——财富管理业务。该类业务具有独特的利益冲突问题,以公募基金投资建议服务为例,基金投顾会倾向于为投资者推荐佣金更多而非更适合的产品。面对这一利益冲突,部分域外监管机构试图强制实现从卖方投顾向买方投顾的付费模式转型以及对所有投顾施加统一的客户最佳利益义务,我国监管机构目前亦鼓励卖方投顾向买方投顾的转型。本文通过经济分析发现,域外监管干预措施都是非效率的,宜采取区分监管的思路:对于投资者支付投顾费用的买方投顾,严格禁止其直接或间接从基金端收受销售佣金,促进客户最佳利益义务或信义义务的履行;对于佣金激励下的卖方投顾,设置明确的佣金费率上限,促进适当性义务的履行。

The New Asset Management Regulation is committed to rectification to restore order. However, it does not involve the wealth management business, which is an important part after the great asset management back to basics. This business involves a unique issue of conflict of interest. Taking mutual fund recommendation services as an example, advisers tend to recommend products paying more commissions rather than those that are more suitable for their clients. Facing this conflict of interest, some foreign regulators have tried to force the transition from the sell-side investment adviser mode to the buy-side adviser mode, and impose a unified obligation of the best interests of customers on all investment advisers. Chinese regulator is also encouraging the transition from the sell-side investment adviser mode to the buy-side adviser mode. Based on economic analysis, this paper finds that these foreign regulatory intervention measures are inefficient. It is advisable to adopt the idea of differentiated supervision.For buy-side advisers paid by investors, they should be stringently prohibited from directly or indirectly receiving distribution commissions from the fund side, thus enforcing the client’s best interests rule or the fiduciary duty. For sell-side advisers incentivized by commissions, a clear upper limit of the commission rate should be established, so as to facilitate the fulfillment of the suitability obligation.