企业涉房投资与员工薪酬差距

Corporate Investment in Housing and Employee Pay Gap

本文基于2007—2019年上市公司数据实证检验了企业涉房投资行为对内部员工薪酬差距的影响,其结果显示:其一,企业涉房投资显著加大了高管人员和普通员工之间的薪酬差距,降低了普通员工的平均薪酬水平,提高了高管人员的平均薪酬水平,多种稳健性检验和控制内生性后的工具变量回归均支持这一结论。其二,进一步的机制分析显示,企业涉房投资扩大薪酬差距是由议价能力效应、代理成本效应和资源挤占效应的联合作用所致。其三,企业涉房投资对薪酬差距的影响更多集中在货币紧缩时期和企业成长期、衰退期,对作为实体经济核心部门的制造业的影响要大于对非制造业的影响,其对不同所有制企业的薪酬差距影响方式也不尽相同,国有企业主要是通过提高高管薪酬水平来实现,而非国有企业主要是通过降低普通员工薪酬水平来实现。其四,涉房投资对薪酬差距的影响具有较强的可逆性,未来能够通过抑制企业涉房投资倾向有效调控薪酬差距。本文的研究对引导企业“脱虚向实”以及优化企业薪酬安排具有一定的参考意义。

Based on data from listed companies from 2007-2019, this paper empirically examines the impact of corporate investment in housing on internal employee pay gap and finds that: First, corporate investment in housing significantly increases the pay gap between executives and ordinary employees, thus reducing the average pay of ordinary employees and increases the average pay of executives, which is supported by multiple robustness tests and regressions on instrumental variables controlling for endogeneity. Second, further mechanistic analysis shows that the widening of the pay gap by corporate investment in housing is the combined result of bargaining power effect, agency cost effect and resource crowding-out effect. Third, the impact is more concentrated on real economy sector especially manufacturing, and is more obvious when monetary policy is tightening as well as when the enterprise is in growth and recession. The way in which it affects the pay gap is different between SOEs and non-SOEs, the former mainly through increasing pays of the executives while the latter mainly through reducing pays of employees. Fourth, the impact of housing related investment on the pay gap is highly reversible. In the future, the pay gap can be effectively adjusted and controlled by inhibiting the propensity of enterprises to invest in housing. The research of this paper has certain reference significance for guiding enterprises to "enter fictitious economy from real economy" and optimizing enterprise salary arrangement.