高管学缘关系的多样性与企业非效率投资:来自产融结合型企业的证据

Diversity of Senior Executives’Academic Background and Inefficient Investment: Evidence from Industry-Finance Integrated Enterprises

以沪深A股市场上实施产融结合的非金融类公司为样本,深入探讨了公司高管学缘、公司治理与企业非效率投资的关系。研究发现,产融型企业内部高管学缘多样性与企业非效率投资之间呈显著的U型关系。换言之,当高管学缘多样性水平尚未达到临界值时,高管学缘多样性有益于缓解企业非效率投资,超过该临界值则会加剧企业非效率投资程度。机制检验发现,高管学缘多样性通过企业代理成本对非效率投资水平产生影响。未来,企业应进一步完善高级管理者选聘机制,注意治理主体之间文化背景和思维方式方面的相似性与差异性;同时不断完善公司高管团队的继续教育和团队培训机制,注重培育和健康使用高管间的社会关系。

With the non-financial enterprises that implement industry and finance integration in the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets as a sample, a deep analysis of the relationship among the academic background of senior executives, corporate governance and inefficient investment is conducted. The study finds that there is a prominent “U-shaped” relationship between the diversity of senior executives’ academic background and inefficient investment. In other words, before the diversity of senior executives’ academic background reaches the critical value, it is beneficial to alleviate the enterprises’ inefficient investment, while when it exceeds the critical value, it will aggravate inefficient investment. According to the mechanism test, the diversity of senior executives’ academic background has an impact on the level of inefficient investment through agency costs. In the future, the enterprises should further improve the selection and employment mechanism of senior managers and pay attention to the similarities and differences in cultural background and thinking mode between governance subjects. At the same time, it is essential to continue to improve the continuing education and team training mechanism for the enterprises’ senior management team and lay emphasis on the cultivation and healthy use of social relations among senior executives.