摘要
股权激励是实现经理人与股东激励相容、缓解代理问题的重要工具,但鲜有文献关注股权激励本身的结果,缺乏对其终止现象的系统性思考。本文以光峰科技2019—2022年的系列股权激励计划为研究对象,从委托代理理论的视角,分析其2019年股权计划终止的原因,以及光峰科技的系列措施和后续股权激励的变化。研究发现:首先,股权激励的终止并非由于过高的激励成本和业绩目标,新冠肺炎疫情和教育政策的变化可能是导致公司业绩不达标的主要原因;其次,股权激励终止后企业调整了后续的激励设计,体现为归属条件和激励力度的改变;再次,在股权激励“实施—执行—终止”期间,企业在良好的治理水平下稳定了团队并引进诸多高素质人才,在创新产出、社会责任方面表现突出,即使股权激励计划终止也实现了股东财富的增加。本文的案例研究证明,在公司治理水平较好的前提下,股权激励计划的终止并不意味着必然失败,反而在执行期间达成了激励相容的既定目标,是维护股东价值的有力体现。
Equity incentive is an important tool to achieve manager-shareholder incentive co m patibility and alleviate agency problems,but little literature focuses on the results of equity incentives themselves and lacks systematic consideration of their termination phenomenon.This paper takes the series of equity incentive plans of Appotronics Corporation Limited from 2019 to2022 as the research object,and analyzes the reasons for the termination of the 2019 equity plan,as well as the series of measures and subsequent changes of equity incentives of Appotronics Corporation Limited from the perspective of principal-agent theory.We found that:first,the termination of the equity incentive was not due to excessive incentive costs and performance targets,but the COVID-19 and changes in education policies were probably the main reasons for the company’s substandard performance;second,after the termination of the equity incentive,the company adjusted the subsequent incentive design,which was reflected in changes in the ascription of equity conditions and incentive intensity;finally,during"imple mentation-execution-te rmination",the company stabilized its team and brought in many high quality talents,and performed outstandingly in innovation output and social responsibility,and increased sha reholders’wealth even if the equity incentive plan was terminated.The case study in this paper proves that with good corporate governance,the termination of the equity incentive plan does not mean inevitable failure,but rather it is a strong manifestation of maintaining shareholder value by achieving the set goals of incentive com patibility during the implementation period.
作者
吴博雅
董雅浩
王小玫
刘佳伟
邓博夫
Wu Boya;Dong Yahaoo;Wang Xiaomei;Liu Jiawei;Deng Bofu
出处
《管理会计研究》
2023年第1期56-66,共11页
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING STUDIES
关键词
股权激励终止
委托代理理论
激励相容
Equity Incentive Termination
Principal-agent Theory
Incentive Compatibility