共同机构所有权与股价崩盘风险

Common Institutional Ownership and Stock Price Crash Risk

以2000—2020年A股上市公司为研究样本,考察共同机构所有权对企业股价崩盘风险的影响。实证结果表明,共同机构所有权能够降低股价崩盘风险,该结论在使用Heckman两阶段、PSM-DID等方法检验后依然成立。进一步,影响机制分析的结果表明,共同机构所有权主要通过缓解代理问题和降低信息不对称两条路径影响股价崩盘风险。公司内部治理水平越低,作为外部治理机制的共同机构所有权在降低公司股价崩盘风险方面作用越显著,这表明共同机构所有权与内部治理机制在某种程度上存在替代作用。

Taking A-share listed companies from 2000 to 2020 as the sample,this study investigates the impact of common institutional ownership on corporate stock price crash risk.The empirical results suggest that common institutional ownership can reduce stock price crash risk,and this conclusion is still robust after testing with Heckman two-stage regression,PSM-DID and other methods.Further,the results of impact mechanism analysis show that the common institutional ownership mainly affects the stock price crash risk through reducing agency conflict and reducing information asymmetry.Finally,this study finds that when the level of corporate internal governance is lower,the role of common institutional ownership as an external governance mechanism is more significant in reducing the risk of corporate stock price crash,which indicates that common institutional ownership and internal governance mechanisms have substitution effects to some extent.