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基于碳限额与交易机制的上下游企业可再生能源投资策略研究 被引量:5

Research on Upstream and Downstream Enterprises of Renewable Energy Investment under Cap-and-Trade Mechanism
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摘要 本文在碳限额与交易机制的背景下,构建了由发电商与售电商组成的二级电力供应链,考虑了发电商投资可再生能源与售电商投资可再生能源两种不同情形。在此基础上,研究了电价与可再生能源投资决策问题。通过比较不同情形下的均衡结果,主要的研究结果如下:(1)相对于发电商投资可再生能源的情形而言,售电商投资可再生能源的情形中将有更多的投资量。(2)在发电商投资可再生能源的情形中,售电商的利润低于发电商的利润;而在售电商投资可再生能源的情形中,售电商的利润高于发电商的利润。(3)可再生能源投资成本系数的增加,将降低可再生能源的投资量、电价和电力需求量,从而导致售电商利润会减少,但发电商利润会增加。(4)可再生能源偏好系数的增加使得售电商利润增加,发电商利润减少。 The greenhouse effect causes global warming,which has attracted attention from all of society.Carbon emissions are the main driver of the greenhouse effect,so it is urgent to reduce them.The electric power industry is the largest carbon emitter,accounting for about 40%of total carbon emissions.Renewable energy is attractive because it produces zero carbon emissions,and increasing investment in it can help optimize the energy infrastructure.However,investment requires capital,so enterprises pursuing profit maximization are reluctant to over-invest in renewable energy.Government implementation of a cap-and-trade mechanism is one incentive for investment.Moreover,consumer preferences for renewable energy affect investment behavior because they influence market demand.Therefore,investors are influenced by cap-and-trade mechanisms and consumer preferences.In an electricity supply chain,electricity generation enterprise(“generator”)investing in renewable energy must satisfy the requirements of the cap-and-trade mechanism,while electricity retailer(“retailer”)invest in renewable energy to satisfy consumer preferences.Generator and retailer make renewable energy investment decisions with consideration of the cap-and-trade mechanism and consumer preferences for renewable energy.Therefore,considering these two factors,which,generator or retailer,can invest more in renewable energy.In order to solve the above problems,a two-level electricity supply-chain model comprising a generator acting as a“leader”and a retailer acting as a“follower”is constructed.Generator and retailer investing renewable energy are considered separately.Renewable energy investment and electricity price decisions are discussed.Through backward induction,equilibrium solutions are obtained.Based on the equilibrium solutions,different cases of renewable energy investment,electricity prices,and electricity demands are compared.It considers the influences of a renewable energy investment cost coefficient and renewable energy preference coefficient on profit.The main results are as follows:(1)Retailer will invest more in renewable energy than the generator.(2)When the generator invests in renewable energy,the profit of the retailer is lower than that of the generator;meanwhile,when the retailer invests in renewable energy,the profit of the retailer is higher than that of the generator.(3)An increase in the renewable energy investment cost coefficient will reduce renewable energy investment,electricity prices,electricity demand,and the retailer’s profit while increasing the generator’s profit.(4)With an increase in the renewable energy preference coefficient,the retailer’s profit increases while the generator’s profit decreases.In addition,the basic model is extended by considering the unit carbon quota and the intermittent nature of renewable energy.The results also show that the retailer will invest more in renewable energy than the generator in extended models.Existing research has rarely considered downstream enterprises that may invest in low-carbon technology,while a downstream electricity retailer investing in renewable energy is considered in this paper.This complements the case of considering a downstream electricity retailer investing in low-carbon technology and further enriches the low-carbon investment field.Moreover,generator or retailer investment in renewable energy may affect the operational mechanism of the electricity supply chain.Therefore,this study identifies which case better fosters renewable energy investment—the generator or retailer—and its practical significance for participation in an electricity supply chain.
作者 陈威 马永开 白春光 CHEN Wei;MA Yong-kai;BAI Chun-guang(School of Management and Economics,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731,China)
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2023年第1期70-80,共11页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金资助重点项目(71531003) 国家自然科学基金资助面上项目(72072021,71772032) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(18YJC630266) 中国博士后科学基金资助面上项目(2020M673154)。
关键词 碳限额与交易机制 可再生能源投资 电力供应链 cap-and-trade mechanism renewable energy investment electricity supply chain
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