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责任式创新的多主体演化博弈研究——以新冠疫苗研发为例 被引量:4

A Multi-agent Evolutionary Game on Responsible Innovation: Evidence from the R&D of COVID-19 Vaccine
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摘要 责任式创新需要多主体的共同参与,探索企业、消费者、政府等多主体的演化博弈规律,对于推动以新冠疫苗研发为典型代表的责任式创新具有重要意义。本文以新冠疫苗研发为例,构建了企业、消费者和政府三方在实施责任式创新行为中的演化博弈模型,并通过MATLAB进行数值模拟。结果表明,在责任式创新过程中,三方最终的演化稳定策略是企业实施责任式创新、公众参与责任式创新,但政府弱干预(消极提倡)责任式创新;企业的收益和成本、政府补贴均影响企业和消费者的演化结果,而对政府决策影响较小;利益相关者的初始状态对三方演化收敛速度有显著影响。 With the pandemic of COVID-19, a safe, effective, and economical vaccine is seen as the ultimate solution, which calls for the application of responsible innovation. Responsible innovation requires the joint participation of multiple stakeholders, and it is of great importance to promoting responsible innovation represented by the R&D of COVID-19 vaccine, through exploring the evolutionary game law of multiple stakeholders such as enterprises, consumers, and governments. By taking the R&D of COVID-19 vaccine as an example, an evolutionary game model of enterprises, consumers and the government in implementing responsible innovation behaviors is constructed through Jacobian Matrix and Replicated Dynamic Equation, and six numerical simulations as the cost analysis for enterprises implementing responsible innovation, the benefit analysis for enterprises implementing responsible innovation or not, the subsidy analysis for the government supporting enterprises’ responsible innovation, the subsidy analysis for the government supporting consumers’ responsible innovation, and the initial state analysis of different stakeholders are conducted by using MATLAB. The research finding are as follows,(1) in the process of responsible innovation, the final stable strategy of three stakeholders is that, enterprises implement responsible innovation, the public participate in responsible innovation, but the government weakly interferes(passively promotes) responsible innovation;(2) both the benefits and costs of enterprises and government subsidies affect the evolution results of enterprises and consumers, but has little effect on the decision-making of governments;and(3) the initial state of stakeholders has a significant impact on the convergence speed of the tripartite evolution. This study, by anchoring itself as exploring the dynamic mechanism of how multiple stakeholders interact with each other to jointly push the implementation of responsible innovation, has a good contribution to deepen the theory of responsible innovation through a quantitative analysis methodology, and can be referred by the policy makers, entrepreneurs and consumers in practice.
作者 卢超 邢窈窈 蒋璐 LU Chao;XING Yao-yao;JIANG Lu(School of Management,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444,China)
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSCD 北大核心 2023年第1期226-237,共12页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(72174116) 上海市“科技创新行动计划”软科学研究计划主题项目(22692101200)。
关键词 责任式创新 演化博弈 新冠疫苗研发 responsible innovation evolutionary game the R&D of COVID-19 vaccine
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