“减规模”还是“增绿色”?异质性环保政策工具下的企业环保行为响应

“Production Cut” or “Green Development?” The Corporate Environmental Protection Behavior Responsiveness Induced by Heterogeneous Environmental Policy Instruments

市场机制和绿色投资型环保政策工具既是对命令控制型工具的有益补充,也可能在企业层面引致更加复杂的环保行为响应,企业“减规模”抑或“增绿色”还存在不确定性。为此,本文借助计量模型,基于2011-2019年重污染上市公司的微观数据,探讨企业在不同政策工具下的环保行为响应。研究发现:各类环保政策工具的“增绿色”属性突出;环境监管和排污收费均引致企业环保支出和绿色创新水平提升的“增绿色”响应;环保补助则带来企业以环保支出为主的“增绿色”响应;环境监管和排污收费两种政策工具并不相容,互相阻滞了对环保支出的激励效应;宽松的融资约束和富有的企业家精神将放大排污收费的“增绿色”效果,而环保补助对引导融资约束下的“增绿色”响应更加有效。本文结论启示环保部门需了解不同政策工具的异质性后果,合理进行工具组合,并面向不同特征企业精准施策。

Market-based and green-investment-based environmental policy instruments enrich the existing command-and-control instrument, and may also induce more complex corporate environmental protection behavior responsiveness. There has the uncertainty of the“production cut” and “green development.” Based on the micro-dataset of pollution-intensive and listed enterprises in during 2011-2019, econometric models are adopted and the corporate environmental protection behavior responsiveness induced by heterogeneous environmental policy instruments is analyzed. The results show that, both environmental supervision and pollution fee induce green development, including significant environmental expenditure and green innovation. Environmental subsidy leads to the green development majored by environmental expenditure. As for the instrument mix, the incompatibility is concluded between environmental supervision and pollution fee, and two instruments weaken each other’s green development effect. Furthermore, in enterprises with looser financial constraints and higher entrepreneurship levels, pollution fee induces more significant green development. Environmental subsidy is more effectiveness for green development in enterprises with financial constraints. The results imply that governments should understand the heterogeneous outcomes by policy instruments, choosing the appropriate instrument and mix to specific enterprise with different characteristics.