环保考核下晋升激励与城市空气污染——基于官员年龄视角和模糊断点回归的研究

Political Promotion Incentives and Air Pollution Control under Environmental Assessment:Based on the Perspective of the Officials’Ages and the Method of Fuzzy RD

基于2007—2018年全国263个地级市层面的相关数据,将官员年龄是否在53岁以下作为官员晋升激励变化的工具变量,借助模糊断点回归的方法,实证分析了环保考核下由官员自身因素产生的晋升激励对城市空气污染的影响。结果发现:由官员自身因素产生的晋升激励并未与中央环保考核的政治激励产生呼应,具有较强晋升激励的官员并没有积极解决辖区空气污染问题。进一步地,基于地级市经济增长目标数据,具有较强晋升激励的官员未能重视空气污染问题,是因为当前地方官员依然将辖区经济发展作为政府主要任务;具有较强晋升激励的地方官员同样存在战略性减排的行为;当城市是由晋升激励均强的官员或者晋升激励较强的市委书记和晋升激励较弱的市长共同管辖时,城市的空气质量则会变得较差。

Based on relevant data from 2007-2018 at the level of 263 prefectures across China,this paper studies the impact of promotion incentives generated by officials’own factors on urban air pollution under environmental assessment with the help of fuzzy depressional discontinuity and using whether the officials’age was below 53 years as an instrumental variable for the change in officials’promotion incentives.The results show that promotion incentives generated by officials’own factors did not echo the political incentives of the central environmental assessment,and officials with strong promotion incentives did not actively address air pollution problems in their jurisdictions.Further,based on the data on economic growth targets for prefecture-level cities,officials with strong promotion incentives fail to focus on air pollution because local officials still consider economic development in their jurisdictions as the main government task;local officials with strong promotion incentives also act strategically to reduce emissions;when cities are governed by officials with strong promotion incentives or by municipal party secretaries with strong promotion incentives and mayors with weak promotion incentives.When cities are governed by officials with strong incentives for promotion,or by city clerks with strong incentives for promotion and mayors with weak incentives for promotion,air quality in cities becomes poorer.