摘要
作为当代著名的动物保护倡导者,辛格从理论层面持续对物种歧视进行抨击。其学说认为,感受性(sentience)是一种动物享有利益,且其利益应当在道德上被平等考虑的充分条件。然而,因为辛格在定义和使用“感受性”概念时,没有严格区分痛苦(suffering)和疼痛(pain)概念,导致其理论存在一定的含混性。本文中,我们首先尝试对“感受性”的理论内涵做出更为细致的澄清,认为辛格所指的“感受性”应当被精确理解为“关于疼痛的现象意识”。其次表明了,辛格动物保护学说的理论基础还关涉到关于动物意识的探究。最后,借助当前关于动物意识以及他心问题的最新研究成果,我们对辛格的动物保护学说的理论基础进行了必要的补充。
As a well-known contemporary animal protection advocate,Peter Singer has always been assailing speciesism at the theoretical level.His theory holds that sentience is a sufficient condition for animals to enjoy interests and their interests should be morally considered equally.However,Singer did not distinguish between suffering and pain strictly when defining and using the concept of“sentience”,which led to some ambiguity in his theory.In this paper,we first try to make a more detailed clarification of the theoretical connotation of“sentience”,believing that the“sentience”referred to by Singer should be accurately understood as“phenomenal consciousness about pain”.Secondly,we show that the theoretical basis of Singer’s animal protection theory is related to the research of animal consciousness.Finally,based on the latest research of other minds problem,we make a necessary supplement to the theoretical basis of Singer’s animal protection theory.
作者
王晓阳
樊一锐
WANG Xiaoyang;FAN Yirui(Department of Philosophy,Xiamen University,Xiamen,Fujian,361001)
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
北大核心
2023年第3期1-11,共11页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
基金
国家社科基金一般项目“他心问题的基础理论研究”(项目编号:20BZX030)。
关键词
辛格
动物保护
动物意识
感受性
他心问题
Singer
Animal protection
Animal consciousness
Sentience
Other minds problem