物种歧视与边缘例子论证

Speciesism and the Argument from Marginal Cases

本文分析了科斯嘉德、诺齐克与杜内叶对边缘例子论证的批评,认为他们从不同含义的整体论视角对于边缘例子论证所进行批判并不能说明边缘例子论证是无效的;也不认为存在一种诺齐克所讲的“种属道德”,因为道德关系的基础是现实的相关性,而不是生物学分类中的作为种属标识的解剖学特征;如果依据诺齐克所言道德确实需要依赖于某种整体性背景,那么动物伦理学所依赖的应该是由人类文明与自然世界所共同构成的那种整体性背景,正是在这背景下,人类对其他动物的道德义务才变得显而易见。

This paper analyzes the criticisms offered by Christine M.Korsgaard,Robert Nozick and Joan Dunayer against the Argument from Marginal Cases(AMC)and holds that these criticisms,with different holistic perspectives,do not invalidate AMC.Neither does it agrees with Nozick that there exists a“morality of species”,because the basis of moral relationship is the relevance in real life,rather than the anatomical features that are taken as species identification marks in biological classification.If morality needs to be laid in a holistic background,as argued by Nozick,the holistic background in which animal ethics needs to be laid is the one that takes both human civilization and the natural world into account.It is only against this background that human’s moral duty and obligation to other animals become clear.