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跳出历史周期率两个答案的作用机理及相互关系 被引量:1

Two Answers to Escaping the Historical Cycle and Their Dialectical Relationship
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摘要 历史周期率是中国历史上历代政权普遍经历由治到乱、由兴到衰的周期性现象。历史周期率发生的直接原因是公权力走向整体性腐败,根本原因则是公权力行使者出现“变质”。当代中国要破除历史周期率的魔咒,须让党员干部不断“提质”而非“变质”。毛泽东提出的人民监督和习近平提出的自我革命,是中国共产党跳出历史周期率的两个答案。一方面,人民群众具有监督党员干部的监督势能、监督根据、监督能力、监督意愿和监督品质等优势,让党员干部没有机会“变质”;另一方面,自我革命能帮助党员干部确立“提质”的方向目标、找到“提质”的动力勇气以及建立健全“提质”的工作机制,二者内外结合、相互促进,有力保障了中国共产党执政队伍的先进性、纯洁性以及长期执政能力的不断提升。 The historical cycle of rise and fall is a cyclical phenomenon all dynasties in Chinese history experienced.The direct reason for the occurrence of the historical cycle is the systematic corruption of public power,while the deep-seated reason is the“deterioration”of the authority who held and wielded public power.In order for China to break the spell of historical periodicity,Party members and cadres must continuously“improve”rather than“deteriorate”.“People’s Supervision”suggested by Mao Zedong and“Self-Revolution”suggested by Xi Jinping constitute the two answers for the Chinese Communist Party to escape the historical cycle.On the one hand,the masses have the advantages of supervising Party members and cadres from such perspectives as potential energy,basis,ability,willingness and quality of supervision,so that Party members and cadres have no chance to“deteriorate”.On the other hand,self-revolution can help Party members and cadres to establish the direction and goal of“quality improvement”,to find the motivation and courage of“quality improvement”,and to establish and improve the working mechanism of“quality improvement”,the combined force from within and without mutually enhancing each other,effectively guaranteeing the advanced quality and of the Party,improving its power-execution capability.
作者 王平 周茹 WANG Ping;ZHOU Ru(School of Marxism,Anhui University,Hefei 230601,Anhui,China)
出处 《廉政文化研究》 2022年第6期8-17,共10页 Anti-corruption and Integrity Culture Studies
基金 国家社会科学基金一般项目(18BKS109)。
关键词 历史周期率 人民监督 自我革命 historical cycle the supervision of the public self-revolution
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