非国有股东治理与国有企业创新:倒U型关系及其形成机理检验

Governance of Non-state Shareholders and Innovation of State-owned Enterprises:An Inverted U-shaped Relationship and Its Formation Mechanism Test

提升国有企业创新水平对于推动国有企业高质量发展和经济结构转型升级具有重要意义。在混合所有制改革持续推进的背景下,以中国A股2008—2020年国有上市公司为样本,考察非国有股东治理对国有企业创新的影响。研究发现:非国有股东持股与企业创新投入和创新产出之间存在倒U型关系;代理问题和内部控制在非国有股东持股与国有企业创新之间起到了中介作用,且非国有股东持股与代理问题之间存在U型关系,与内部控制之间存在倒U型关系;在商业类国有企业、地方国有企业和高市场化水平地区的国有企业中,非国有股东持股与企业创新之间的倒U型关系更为显著;非国有股东向国有企业委派董事、监事和高管可以有效提升国有企业创新水平。

Improving the innovation level of state-owned enterprises is of great significance for promoting the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises and the transformation and upgrading of economic structure. In the context of the continuous promotion of mixed ownership reform, this paper examines the impact of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the innovation of state-owned enterprises, taking China’s A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2020 as a sample. The research finds that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between non-state-owned shareholders’ shareholding and enterprise innovation input and output. Agency problem and internal control play an intermediary role between non-state-owned shareholders’ shareholding and state-owned enterprise innovation, and there is a U-shaped relationship between non-state-owned shareholders’ shareholding and agency problem, and an inverted U-shaped relationship between non-state-owned shareholders’ shareholding and internal control.Among commercial state-owned enterprises, local state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises in high market level areas, the inverted U-shaped relationship between non-state-owned shareholders’ shareholding and enterprise innovation is more significant. The appointment of directors, supervisors and senior executives by non-state-owned shareholders to state-owned enterprises can effectively improve the innovation level of state-owned enterprises.