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考虑中央政府奖惩的黄河流域政府间生态补偿博弈分析 被引量:2

Analysis of the Inter-Governmental Ecological Compensation Game in the Yellow River Basin Considering Central Government Rewards and Punishments
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摘要 建立流域生态补偿机制是保护黄河流域生态环境的重要举措,为了给黄河流域生态补偿机制的完善提供理论依据,从博弈基本理论出发,设定黄河上中游政府与下游政府为生态补偿博弈的主体,上中游政府可选择的博弈策略有积极保护和消极保护,下游政府可选择的策略有补偿和不补偿,将中央政府依据流域各省(区)政府履行生态环境保护职责的绩效进行激励或惩罚作为生态补偿博弈的影响因子,构建黄河流域生态补偿演化博弈模型,分析博弈双方在各种情形下的稳定策略。研究结果表明:若上中游政府保护生态环境的成本较小,则无论下游政府是否对上中游政府给予补偿,上中游政府均有保护生态环境的动力;若需要下游政府给上中游政府支付的生态补偿金额较小,则无论上中游政府是否积极保护生态环境,下游政府都愿意对上中游政府保护流域生态环境的成本予以补偿;中央政府提高奖惩力度有利于博弈双方选择最优稳定策略(下游政府主动补偿、上中游政府积极保护)。提出了完善黄河流域生态补偿的财政转移机制、建立科学的生态补偿计算体系、实施多元化生态补偿机制等政策建议。 In order to provide a theoretical basis for the improvement of the ecological compensation mechanism in the Yellow River Basin, we set the upstream and midstream governments of the Yellow River and the downstream governments as the subjects of the ecological compensation game from the basic game theory, and the upstream and midstream governments could choose the game strategies of active protection and negative protection, while the downstream governments could choose the strategies of compensation and without compensation. The central government would give incentives or punishments to the provincial(regional) governments according to their performance in ecological protection as the influence factor of the ecological compensation game, build the game model of ecological compensation in the Yellow River basin and analyze the stable strategies of both sides in various situations. The results show that if the amount of ecological compensation that the downstream government needs to pay to the upstream and midstream governments is small, the downstream government is willing to compensate the upstream and midstream governments for the cost of protecting the ecological environment in the river basin regardless of whether the upstream and midstream governments actively protect the ecological environment or not;the central government’s increase in rewards and penalties is conducive to both sides of the game choosing the optimal stabilization strategy(the downstream government actively compensates, the upstream and midstream governments actively protect). Policy suggestions are put forward to improve the financial transfer mechanism of ecological compensation in the Yellow River Basin, establish a scientific ecological compensation calculation system and implement a diversified ecological compensation mechanism.
作者 朱永明 牛蓝霄 赵哲耘 ZHU Yongming;NIU Lanxiao;ZHAO Zheyun(School of Management Engineering of Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China;School of Marxism of Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China;Development Planning Office of Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China)
出处 《人民黄河》 CAS 北大核心 2023年第3期1-6,31,共7页 Yellow River
基金 中国工程院重大咨询研究项目(2020-ZD-18-5) 教育部人文社会科学规划基金资助项目(20YJA630101)。
关键词 生态补偿 博弈 地方政府 生态环境保护 黄河流域 ecological compensation game local government ecological environmental protection Yellow River Basin
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