水环境治理PPP项目的多主体行为演化博弈

Multi-Agent Behavior Evolutionary Game of Water Environment Treatment PPP Projects

基于水环境治理PPP项目多主体不同策略组合下的收益函数,构建政府主体、经济主体和社会主体多主体演化博弈模型,并通过MATLAB软件进行数值模拟和参数敏感性分析.结果表明:在一定条件下复制动态系统可以达到积极规制,自主推进,主动参与的理想稳定状态;激励措施可以加快自主推进、主动参与策略收敛速度,但激励强度并非越强越好;演化稳定策略受惩罚力度和损失系数γ影响,对损失系数β不敏感.

Based on the income function of water environment treatment PPP projects under different strategy combinations of multi-agent, a multi-agent evolutionary game model was established among government agent, economic agent and social agent, and numerical simulation and parameter sensitivity analysis were carried out by MATLAB software. The results show that the replication dynamic system can achieve the ideal stable state of active regulation, independent promotion and active participation under certain conditions. The incentive measures can accelerate convergence speed of autonomous promotion and active participation strategies, but the incentive intensity is not as better as it gets stronger. The evolution stability strategy is affected by penalty intensity and loss coefficient γ, but it isn′t insensitive to loss coefficient β.