不对称信息下考虑延保服务的企业佣金契约设计——基于产品服务供应链背景

Design of Enterprise Commission Contract Considering Extended Warranty Service under Asymmetric Information in Context of Product and Service Supply Chain

针对制造商提供产品、零售商销售产品并提供延保服务的产品服务供应链,延保服务成本与产品的维修成本系数密切相关,考虑信息不对称下产品的维修成本系数为制造商的私有信息,建立了零售商激励制造商分享产品维修成本系数的委托代理模型,研究了零售商的佣金契约设计,分析了不对称信息、零售商延保服务水平等因素对均衡结果的影响。研究表明:不对称信息可以提高制造商利润而降低零售商利润;随着延保服务水平的提高,零售商更需要在产品质量成本上与制造商拥有对称信息;零售商降低制造商的相关销售费用,提高延保服务收益分享比例等有助于制造商分享成本信息,并提高供应链企业利润。

Targeting at a product and service supply chain where a manufacturer provides products,a retailer sells the products and provides extended warranty services,and the cost of the extended warranty services is closely related to the maintenance cost coefficient of the products,and considering that under information asymmetry,the maintenance cost coefficient of the products is private information to the manufacturer,this paper established a principal-agent model in which the retailer encourages the manufacturer to share the maintenance cost coefficient of the products.Next,it studied the design of the retailer's commission contract,and analyzed the influence of factors such as asymmetric information and retailer's extended warranty service level on the equilibrium result.The research showed that:asymmetric information could increase the profit of the manufacturer but reduce the profit of the retailer;with the improvement of the extended warranty service level,symmetrical information with the manufacturer on the product quality cost appeared more urgent for the retailer;and that by reducing the relevant sales cost of the manufacturer and increasing the profit sharing ratio of the extended warranty services,etc.,the retailer would help the manufacturer share the cost information and improve the overall profits of the companies on the supply chain.