银行风险承担渠道、流动性囤积与货币政策传导的“梗阻效应”研究

Bank Risk-Taking Channel, Liquidity Hoarding and the “Obstruction Effect” on Monetary Policy Transmission

监管部门多次强调,银行要提高对不良贷款考核的容忍度,表明疏通银行风险承担渠道已成为解决货币政策传导不畅问题的重要方面。对此,本文考察银行风险承担渠道两阶段传导环节的具体表现,在此基础上研究流动性囤积对银行风险承担渠道的“梗阻效应”,得出以下主要结论:第一,宽松的货币政策显著提高了银行风险偏好水平,且风险偏好的提升会使银行有更强的信贷反应。第二,银行流动性囤积显著抑制了宽松货币政策对银行风险偏好的促进作用,显著弱化了高风险偏好银行的信贷行为。第三,“梗阻效应”在区域性银行以及资本充足率较低的银行中更为明显。本文的研究刻画出银行普遍进行流动性囤积对银行风险承担渠道形成的“梗阻效应”,为了破解货币政策传导不畅的困局,应更加重视银行流动性囤积在货币政策传导中的影响。

Because the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the downward pressure on the economy, improving the trans-mission of monetary policy has become an essential issue of long-term concern for regulatory authorities. The regulatory au-thorities have repeatedly stressed that banks should improve their tolerance for non-performing loans, indicating that an impor-tant measure to solve the problem of poor monetary policy transmission is to unblock the bank risk-taking channel.This paper selects the annual data of Chinese commercial banks from 2007 to 2019 as a sample to expand the investiga-tion of bank risk-taking channels to banks’ lending behavior, thus forming a complete two-stage inspection. This paper studiesthe “obstruction effect” of liquidity hoarding on bank risk-taking channels. The main conclusions are as follows. Firstly,loose monetary policy significantly improves banks’ risk-taking, leading to more aggressive lending behavior. Secondly, bank li-quidity hoarding significantly inhibits the promotion of flexible monetary policy on bank risk-taking. Further, it weakensbanks’ lending behavior, especially for high risk-taking banks, which indicates that liquidity hoarding has a significant “ob-struction effect” on the bank risk-taking channel. Thirdly, further heterogeneity analysis shows that the “obstruction effect”is more evident in regional banks and banks with low capital adequacy ratios.For the effective transmission of monetary policy, this article gave three suggestions. Firstly, pay more attention to liquidityhoarding to avoid the obstruction of the risk-taking channel while encouraging banks to improve their tolerance for non-performing loans. Secondly, control the pace and intensity of financial supervision to avoid causing excessive liquidity pressureand capital replenishment pressure on banks and avoid forcing them to meet regulatory requirements by hoarding a largeamount of liquidity. Thirdly, focus on improving the capital replenishment capacity of regional banks, and enrich the capital re-plenishment channels by supporting banks to issue perpetual bonds or introducing investors in a market-oriented way to pre-vent capital replenishment pressure from aggravating the “obstruction effect”.