摘要
Starting from the tension and integration between cognitive neuroscience and cognitive psychology, this paper analyzes the waxing and waning of physicalism versus mentalism over the last century and defends an anti-reductionist ontology of the mind. It first argues that “function logically precedes structure” and then refutes two classic arguments about the mind-brain problem. The paper shows that if structure is treated as the logical premise of function, discussions of the mind-brain problem will inevitably lead to dualism or reductionism. Structure cannot explain its own occurrence;instead, if function, which logically precedes structure, is taken as the starting point of the explanation, then the principle of the “ladder of explanation” will be satisfied. A higher-level theory can explain lower-level observed facts, and lower-level observed facts are the cognitive starting point leading to a theory through induction. We conclude that function logically precedes structure;therefore, logically, “the mind shapes the brain.” The logical sequence from function to structure represents a reverse strategy for solving the mind-brain problem.
