农村最低生活保障制度的政府信任效应:理论分析与实证检验

The effect of rural Minimum Livelihood Guarantee on government trust:Theoretical analysis and empirical test

基于制度理论,利用2019年中国社会状况综合调查(CSS)数据分析农村最低生活保障制度对政府信任的影响和作用机制。结果表明:获得农村低保会显著提高个体的政府信任,使用逆概率加权法(IPTW)纠正选择性偏误后该结论仍然成立;反事实分析表明,相较于非低保户,农村低保更有助于提高低保户的政府信任;机制分析显示,农村低保通过提高个体对低保绩效和政府质量的评价进而提高政府信任;异质性分析显示,农村低保的政府信任效应仅对低收入者、中青年人和西部地区显著,而且会随个体政府信任水平和政府层级的提高而减弱。

Based on institutional theory, this paper uses the data of Chinese Social Survey(CSS) in 2019 to analyze the effect and mechanism of rural Minimum Livelihood Guarantee(Dibao) on government trust. It’s concluded that rural Dibao can significantly improve individuals’ government trust. Using Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting(IPTW) to solve selection bias, this conclusion still holds. Counterfactual analysis shows that compared with non-recipient, rural Dibao can improve recipients’ government trust more. Mechanism analysis shows that rural Dibao can improve government trust by improving individuals’ evaluation on Dibao performance and government quality. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the effect of rural Dibao on government trust is only significant in low-income people, young and middle-aged people, and the western region, and will weaken with the increase of individual government trust levels and government levels.