论自然类的含混性

On the Vagueness of Natural Kinds

哲学家通常认为,含混性不仅普遍存在于我们的语言,而且广泛存在于我们周围的世界。但是,自然类概念似乎没有为含混性留下空间。一方面,按照正统的克里普克-普特南语义学解释,自然类语词在每个可能世界中指称相同对象,这使得它们的外延拥有精确边界,并且不会导致堆垛悖论。另一方面,根据科学实在论,自然类对应自然界的真实划分,反映世界的基本结构特征,不同的自然类之间存在明确的界线。然而,无论是自然类语词还是自然类本身都没有排斥含混性,而且自然类语词与自然类的含混性为本体论含混性观点提供了重要例证。

It is widely recognized among philosophers that vagueness not only consists universally in our language, but also in the world around us. However, the concept of natural kinds seems to leave no rooms for vagueness. On the one hand, natural kind terms refer to the same objects across every possible world in terms of the orthodoxy Kripke-Putnam semantics, which makes the extensions of natural kind terms possess sharp boundaries and does not generate sorites paradox. On the other hand, according to scientific realism, natural kinds which correspond to the real classification in the nature, reflect the fundamental structures of the world, and there are precise boundaries between different natural kinds. However, neither natural kind terms nor natural kinds themselves exclude vagueness, and their vagueness provides an important illustration for the ontological view of vagueness.