信息化强征管与自觉纳税遵从

Information-based Powerful Management and Self-enforcement of Tax Compliance

文章从正式登记的视角研究了信息化强征管是否有助于发挥增值税自我强化的纳税遵从特征。文章通过大批量提取文本信息识别出全国注册登记企业的行业属性,构建了行业层面的正式登记率指标,并进一步以分省的投入产出表为基础来计算行业前向关联指数和后向关联指数,检验“金税三期”是否显著提高了行业正式登记率。增值税上、下游反向制约和互相监督的制度特征使得增值税具有天然的自我强化型的纳税遵从特征,理论上应有利于促进上游行业纳税人自觉地进行正式登记,降低非正式经济空间。研究表明,“金税三期”不仅提高了全行业的平均正式登记率,而且更加显著地提高了上游行业的正式登记率。机制分析表明,遵循增值税非对称激励机制来实施监管、跨区域进行联合信息管理以及促使上游行业形成更强的征管威慑预期,是“金税三期”有利于发挥增值税自觉纳税遵从效应的主要原因。研究还发现,离开信息强征管手段的支撑,增值税制度并不能自动引导产生纳税遵从。研究认为,当征管力度不充分时,增值税引导纳税人自觉纳税遵从的特征无法得到充分发挥,甚至可能导致更加严重的纳税不遵从结果。因此,良好的税收制度需要借助信息化强征管手段,才能将制度优势充分落到实处。

In recent years, China has been implementing a series of tax abatement policies. However, a substantial number of firms evade tax though the abuse of tax preferential policies. Under this circumstance, it is important for tax authorities to strengthen enforcement to make sure a precise release of tax reform bonus.Theoretically, VAT has built-in self-enforcement properties due to asymmetric incentives and third-party information mechanisms. In VAT, upstream sellers want to hide sales but downstream buyers intend to overreport input costs, the opposing force constrains trading partners from tax evasion. With respect to tax registration, VAT’s self-enforcement properties should make upstream sellers officially register in the tax-collection system, as downstream buyers would not get invoices to deduct input costs if sellers failed to register.In this paper, we study how information-based powerful tax-collection management exploits the full use of VAT’s self-enforcement properties. The main data we use come from Industrial & Commercial Registration database. Through massive text scanning, we extract industry affiliation information and match the industrial code for each registered firm. Aggregating the number of firm registration by industry and by province,we construct formal registration index at the province-industry-year level. Furthermore, we calculate industries’ forward-linked and backward-linked indices based on the province-level input-output table. After these data working, we construct the DID model to examine the effect of the Golden Ⅲ project on the formal registration rate, especially among industries with stronger forward-linked properties. The results show that, the Golden Ⅲ project, which is an information-based technological tax-collection system, enhances the formal registration rate. The effect is more pronounced for upstream industries. Three reasons explain why the Golden Ⅲ project facilitates a better use of self-enforcement properties in VAT: First and foremost, it manages tax collection based on the asymmetric incentive mechanism embedded in VAT. Second, it imposes a stronger deterrence effect on upstream sellers, as sellers expect higher detection risks than buyers when tax authorities carry out intensive inspections following the asymmetric incentives mechanism. Third, it collects VAT-related information for tax audit analysis across regions and strengthens tax enforcement. As traditional enforcement and self-enforcement is complementary, VAT’s self-enforcement properties are more effective as traditional enforcement is improved. We also examine the effect of Business-to-VAT(BTV) reform on the formal registration rate, and find that BTV has no significant effect on the formal registration rate. Without powerful taxcollection management, the self-enforcement property in VAT compliance cannot play its role, perhaps leading to worse tax non-compliance.This paper points out that: The self-enforcement property in VAT can be better exploited when effective tax enforcement is at play, and tax authorities should strengthen enforcement to make sure that a good tax can fully reach its potential.