动态价格下生鲜农产品供应链合作博弈分析

Game Analysis of Fresh Agricultural Supply Chain Cooperation under Dynamic Price

“公司+农户”型订单农业是我国生鲜农产品供应链的重要模式,合作双方通过签订互惠契约进行交易,这种直接对接的合作方式促进了农户增收,稳定了公司采购渠道。但在实际合作中,双方利益冲突明显。因此,根据生鲜农产品的特点和市场价格的动态特性,分析公司与农户双方因利益冲突的违约问题具有一定的现实意义。通过建立灰博弈模型,分析在市场动态价格下影响公司与农户博弈结果的主要因素,提出使公司与农户双方绩效最大化的策略和措施,并进行了实例分析。结果表明:增加双方违约成本和设置合理的农户奖励补贴,可有效降低双方违约率。“公司+农户”订单型农业在市场动态价格下,制定合理的奖励补贴和违约处罚金,使履约的收益大于违约的收益时,公司与农户双方都履约,一定程度上实现了公司与农户之间的利益协调,保证了双方合作的稳定性。

Order agriculture of "Company + Farmer" type is an important mode of China’s fresh agricultural supply chain. The two partners trade by signing a mutual benefit contract, and the cooperation way of direct jointing promotes the farmer’s income and stabilizes the company’s procurement channels. However, in the process of practical cooperation, the conflict of interests is obvious between the two sides. Therefore, according to the characteristics of fresh agricultural products and the dynamic characteristics of market prices, it is of certain practical significance to analyze the breach of contract between the company and the farmer due to the conflict of interests. By establishing a grey game model, the paper analyzed the main factors affecting the game results between the company and farmer at dynamic market prices, and put forward strategies and measures to maximize the performance of both company and farmer, and finally an example analysis was given. The results showed that increasing the cost of contract breach both parties and setting up reasonable incentives and subsidies for farmer could effectively reduce the default rate of both parties. The order agriculture of "Company + Farmer" mode makes both the company and farmer fulfill the contract through formulating reasonable incentives and subsidies and penalties for breach of contract under the dynamic prices, which to a certain extent realizes the coordination of interests between the company and farmer and ensures the stability of cooperation between the two sides.