双向委托情景下双重过度自信融资平台多任务动态激励契约设计

Multi-task dynamic incentive contract design of dual overconfident financing platform in the two-way entrustment scenario

针对平台融资过程中复杂的利益相关关系及多任务问题,本文考虑融资平台双重过度自信,并引入包含融资平台对领投方激励的双向委托概念,设计了基于三阶段动态博弈的双向委托情景下双重过度自信融资平台多任务动态激励契约模型,从系统参与主体视角和政府视角审视了激励契约中的相关问题。研究发现:(1)平台融资必须重视参与主体间的双向委托问题,并引入融资平台对领投方的激励机制,但需警惕过度激励背后潜藏的风险;(2)政府及社会评估机构需重新审视传统的以风险厌恶指标为主体的系统风险评估体系;(3)政府需加强对平台融资过程监管,并通过资源整合降低融资平台风控成本,提升融资项目运行的稳定性;(4)平台融资系统的健康运行必须限制融资平台的第一类过度自信倾向;(5)激励契约履行过程中,异质投资主体及融资平台不能仅通过判定融资平台第二类过度自信水平进行决策,还必须综合考虑融资平台风险厌恶程度、风控任务产出波动等多方面因素。

Platform economy,which reduces the search cost among investment and financing entities,not only provides channels for the appreciation of idle capital in the society,but also broadens the financing channels for entities of innovation and entrepreneurship.It has grown into a new type of economic business form,serving as a strong guarantee for China′s economic transformation and upgrading.Efficient platform financing is one of the basic conditions to achieve sustainable development of platform economy.However,there exists complex interest-related relations in the process of platform financing,which leads to the two-way principal-agent problem between the financing platform and the lead investor as well as the multi-task problem of the financing platform arising from the heterogeneous objectives of investors,thus bringing troubles for participants to make decisions.Therefore,exploring the principal-agent problem and contract design in the process of platform financing will help provide a basis for scientific decision-making of participants in the platform financing system and support the efficient and sustainable operation of the platform financing system.In this paper,focusing on the complex interest relations and multi-task problem in the platform financing process,given the dual overconfidence of the financing platform,based on the introduction of the concept of two-way entrustment between the financing platform and the lead investor,the author firstly designs a multi-task dynamic incentive contract model of the dual overconfident financing platform in the two-way entrustment scenario based on the three-stage dynamic game,and solves the analytical solution of the multi-task dynamic incentive contract model of the dual overconfident financing platform in the two-way entrustment scenario by employing the backward induction method of dynamic programming;Secondly,through mathematical analysis,the author explores the mathematical relationship between the model solution and important parameters such as incentive coefficient provided by the financing platform to the lead investor,absolute risk aversion coefficient of the financing platform,dual overconfidence level and utility elasticity coefficient of investors.Finally,the relationship between the dual overconfidence of financing platform and the incentive contract design and overconfidence cost of financing platform is explored through analysis of calculation examples.The findings are as follows:(1)The classic heterogeneous principal-agent model ignores the two-way entrustment between the lead investor and the financing platform,and neglects the urgency of the financing platform′s incentive to the leading investor.As a result,the functions of the three parties involved in the platform financing system cannot be effectively divided,which limits the efficient and sustainable operation of the platform financing system.Therefore,the operation of the platform financing system must focus on the two-way entrustment between the participating entities and introduce the incentive mechanism of the financing platform to the lead investor,but it is necessary to be alert to the hidden risks behind excessive incentives;(2)Although higher absolute risk aversion coefficient means that the financing platform has higher investment alertness,this alertness just makes it easy for investors to relax their vigilance against risks of the projects.As a result,the financing platform cannot obtain enough risk control task incentives to deal with the risks,and the platform financing system will fall into systematic risks caused by the higher absolute risk coefficient of the financing platform.Therefore,the government and social assessment agencies need to re-examine the traditional systematic risk assessment system with risk aversion indicators as the main measure;(3)The increase of the cost coefficient of risk control task of the financing platform will eventually lead to the reduction of the effort level of risk control task of the financing platform with the improvement of the level of the second type of overconfidence.Therefore,the government needs to strengthen the supervision of platform financing process and reduce the risk control cost of the financing platform through resource integration to improve the stability of financing project operation;(4)The improvement of the level of the first type of overconfidence of the financing platform raises the incentive coefficient of risk control tasks provided by lead investors and follow-up investors,but it fails to elevate the effort level of risk control task of financing platforms.Therefore,the healthy operation of platform financing system must limit tendency to the first type of overconfidence of the financing platform;(5)Heterogeneous investors and financing platforms can′t make decisions only by judging the level of the second type of overconfidence of financing platforms.Various factors including risk aversion degree of financing platforms and fluctuation of output of risk control tasks should also be considered in the process of fulfilling incentive contracts.