社保征管强度提升对企业社保遵从和工资转嫁的影响

The Impact of Social Security Increasing Levy Intensity on Employers’ Compliance and Fee-Shifting through Wage

文章将北京等11个省级行政区2020年同时将社会保险费从社保经办机构移交税务机构征收视为准自然实验,利用采集自网络招聘平台的招聘广告信息和相应企业的雇主信息,通过RDD模糊断点回归实证检验了征管强度提升对企业社保待遇和工资待遇决策的影响。研究结果表明,社会保险费由税务部门统一征收这一社保征管体制改革总体上显著改善了企业雇主的社保遵从行为,但征管强度提升后企业雇主也逐渐将增加的社保成本负担以降低工资的形式转嫁给员工,这种“转嫁效应”在小微企业表现得尤为明显。进一步分析表明,企业雇主主要通过减少低学历就业人员薪资的方式减轻社保支出负担,而较高学历就业人员则是社保待遇和工资待遇同步提升。这一结果表明,深化社会保障改革需要进一步完善社会保险费征收体制和其他配套政策,进一步促进兼顾公平和效率。

The social security fee collection has been transferred from the Social Security Administration Department to the Tax Bureau in 11 provinces at the same time. As a result, the levy intensity increases for the corporations in these regions. We treat this event as a quasi-natural experiment in this paper, and examine the impact of increasing levy intensity on corporates’ social security benefits and remuneration decisions. We use data collected from an online recruitment platform(Zhaopin.com) and the corresponding data on corporate employers and build RDD fuzzy breakpoint regression models. The results show that the reform of contribution collection system has significantly improved employers’ social insurance compliance. However, the increased collection intensity leads to employers’ fee shifting behaviors and employees’ wage reduction. The fee-shifting effect is more severe in small and micro enterprises. We also find that employers reduce the burden of social insurance expenditure mainly by reducing the salaries of low-educated employees, meanwhile highly-educated employees have their social security benefits and wages improved simultaneously. These results call for deepening reforms in the social insurance premium collection system and other supporting policies, so as to promote the justice and efficiency of related policies.