考虑购物体验的双渠道供应链稳定性分析

Stability Analysis of Dual-channel Supply Chain Considering Shopping Experience

将线下购物体验水平引入由单制造商和双零售商组成的双渠道供应链中,运用非线性动力学理论研究所构建的长期博弈系统的稳定性问题。将整个决策过程分为制造商决策和零售商决策2个阶段,通过分析其对应的特征方程判定各阶段系统的稳定性并给出其稳定域,探究购物体验水平对系统稳定性的影响。研究表明:在斯塔克尔伯格博弈中只有制造商决策系统和零售商决策系统都稳定,整个博弈系统才稳定;两阶段决策系统的稳定性受制于各自的价格调整速度;提高购物体验水平会增大制造商决策系统的稳定域,但会减小零售商决策系统的稳定域。

The offline shopping experience level is introduced into a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and two retailers, and the stability of the long-term game system is studied using nonlinear dynamics theory.The whole decision-making process is divided into two stages: manufacturer decision-making and retailer decision-making.The stability of the system at each stage is determined by analyzing its corresponding characteristic equation and its stability region is given.By so doing the impact of shopping experience level on system stability is explored.The research shows that in the Stackelberg game, the whole game system is stable only when both the manufacturer′s decision system and the retailer′s decision system are stable;the stability of the two-stage decision system is subject to their respective speed of price adjustment;improving the level of shopping experience will increase the stability region of the manufacturer′s decision-making system, but will reduce the stability region of the retailer′s decision-making system.