内部控制、外部监督与上市公司碳信息披露质量——基于博弈论分析

Internal Control,External Supervision and Carbon Information Disclosure Quality of Listed Companies——Based on the Game Theory

基于博弈论视角,分别从内部控制和外部监督层面分析碳信息披露过程中博弈参与方的策略选择。研究显示:降低国家审计机关监督成本、增加监督不力惩罚,督促国家审计机关尽责;增大对上市公司管理层披露虚假信息的处罚力度,加强内部控制;提高内部审计机构的独立性和内部审计机构人员的专业素养,加强和健全内部控制建设等将有助于上市公司碳信息披露质量的提升。

From the perspective of game theory, the strategy choices of game participants in the process of carbon information disclosure are analyzed from the perspectives of internal control and external supervision. The study shows that reducing the supervision costs of national audit institutions, increasing penalties for inadequate supervision, urging state audit institutions to fulfill their responsibilities;increasing penalties for the disclosure of false information by the management of listed companies, strengthening internal control;improving the independence of internal audit institutions and the professionalism of internal audit institution personnel, and strengthening and improving internal control construction will help improve the quality of carbon information disclosure of listed companies.