意向性的建构——物质交往理论批评

Do Things Have Intentionality: A Critique of Material Engagement Theory

随着人类社会深度科技化,意向性问题逐渐获得新的关注。剑桥大学考古系教授马拉福睿斯(Lambros Malafouris)新近提出了物质交往理论,旨在澄清意向性的建构问题。和现象学中作为意识先验结构的意向性不同,意向性在此被理解为一种实践性能动能力。受到延展心灵及现象学的启发,结合认知考古学研究方法,马拉福睿斯对意向性做了深入地探讨,澄清了意向性是如何透过人与物的交往建构起来的。他指出人的意向性是分布的,是在与物的交往过程中涌现出现来的一种特殊能力。物质交往理论的意向性概念提示我们科技伦理研究将不能仅将技术物看作中立工具,进而考察其如何影响既成的价值规范。这一思路从人的固有价值开始,继而考察技术物的使用问题。科技伦理也应深入考察技术物透过其可供性如何影响意向性的生成。参考意向性的建构思路,科技伦理研究将在由人及物的视角之外,获得由物及人的补充思路。

As human society becomes deeply technological, the idea of intentionality is regaining new attention. Lambros Malafouris, Professor of Archaeology at the University of Cambridge, has recently proposed a “Material Engagement Theory” that aims to clarify how intentionality is constructed by man and things. Unlike intentionality as an a priori structure of consciousness in Husserl’s phenomenology, intentionality is understood here as a concrete intention of an action. The material engagement theory considers intentionality as distributed-a capacity that emerges in the interaction of man and materiality. Inspired by the theory of extended mind and phenomenology, Malafouris explored how intentionality is constituted by the interplay between man and things from an archaeological perspective. Malafouris’ s study suggests that ethics of science and technology should not only consider technology as neutral tools and examine how they affect human values, but also investigate how things, through their affordances, help to shape intentional acts. This new perspective might help to deepen our understanding and practice of the ethics of technology.