地方债管理体制改革与基建民企债务违约

Reform in the Management System of Local Government Debt and Default of Private Enterprises in Infrastructure Construction

不同于以往从地方政府债务对民企金融资源挤出角度剖析民企违约的原因,本文关注地方政府通过拖欠款项、“民借官用”方式建立的特殊关联,对基建民企违约产生影响。2015年,我国开始实施的地方债管理体制改革,通过硬化地方政府预算约束来规范其债务融资行为,进而影响了政企间的特殊关联。本文以此次改革作为政策冲击,采用强度双重差分方法,考察改革对于基建民营企业的债务违约欠款的影响。实证结果发现,地方债改革有效降低了基建民企违约欠款,侧面反映出改革对控制政府债务风险向微观主体扩张的政策效果。通过进一步的机制分析,本文发现:一方面,地方债改革减少了政府对基建民企的欠款,进而从资金来源上缓解了企业的信用危机;另一方面,改革也通过减少政府依托基建民企来举借银行贷款的行为,从资金去向上堵住了流失的缺口。

In recent years,Chinese private enterprises have frequently defaulted on their debts,which has raised widespread concern.In the field of infrastructure construction,local governments establish a special relationship with enterprises by defaulting on the project funds of private enterprises and “civilian loan for official use,” which sharply increases the debt risk of private enterprises,affects the normal operation and development of enterprises,and poses a serious threat to economic and social stability in China.In 2015,China began to reform the management system of local government debt;strictly regulate the financing behavior of local governments;strengthen supervision over the use of debt funds;and make clear provisions on the subject,method,management,and construction of supporting institutions of borrowing.By implementing a series of strict normative management measures,the reform can also control the debt default of related private enterprises in the infrastructure industry to a certain extent and curb the expansion trend of the government’s implicit debt risk to micro subjects.This study not only focuses on the policy effect of reform on debt default of private infrastructure enterprises but also reveals the actual effect of the reform on controlling the rapid expansion of local government debt risk to micro entities.In addition,it explores the influence channels,that is,whether the reform standardizes the financing behavior of local governments in terms of the demand for debt funds,reduces the dependence of local governments on private enterprises to start construction,and reduces the delinquency of the government.On the supply side of debt funds,whether the reform restricts local governments and banking financial institutions from providing and accepting illegal guarantees makes it difficult for local governments to obtain bank loans by issuing guarantee letters to private enterprises,thus reducing the debt risks that private enterprises bear.Due to the different financial impacts of the reform,the degree of debt dependence in different regions changed before and after the reform.Therefore,we can use the reform as a policy shock to estimate the differential intensity of the structure.In this study,the intensity impact variables are constructed by using the estimated local government debt data and the real default data of private construction enterprises that have been executed for trust-breaking by the Supreme Court of China to directly measure the default situation of private construction enterprises and analyze the impact of the reform on debt default of private enterprises in infrastructure construction.This study finds that reform in the management system of local government debt reduces the default arrears of private enterprises in infrastructure construction and restrains the expansion of local government debt risk to micro entities.The reform has a significant impact on both the supply and demand of funds.On the one hand,the reform allows local governments to raise construction funds through issuing government bonds and public-private partnership projects,and it reduces local governments’ dependence on private enterprises for infrastructure construction by strengthening supervision.On the other hand,on the supply side,local governments are restricted from issuing guarantees to private enterprises to obtain bank loans to reduce the occurrence of the “civilian loan for official use” phenomenon.However,with the continuous strengthening of the supervision of illegal borrowing by financing platforms,it is still a long way to completely eliminate the occurrence of hidden debt raised by the government through private enterprises in infrastructure construction,and the country still needs to improve the reform of local debt.