寻租效应的“辛普森悖论”及其经济解释——基于ES2012CN的实证研究

The"Simpson Paradox"on Effects of Rent-seeking and Its Economic Interpretation:An Empirical Research Based on ES2012CN

管制寻租在提升微观(企业)经济绩效的同时,往往会降低宏观(国民经济系统)的整体经济绩效,说明不同观察角度(测度层次)上的寻租效应存在矛盾。基于世界银行的中国企业调查数据(ES2012CN),应用倾向得分匹配方法(PSM),对管制寻租的微观(企业)效应和宏观(地区/产业)效应进行测度,进而可以验证寻租效应“辛普森悖论”的存在。这一现象能够从管制寻租的负外部性角度进行经济学解释,具有重要的政策含义。

While the regulation of rent-seeking improves the micro(enterprise)economic performance,it often reduces the overall economic performance of the macro(national economic system),indicating that there are contradictions in rent-seeking effects from different observation perspectives(measurement levels).Based on the data of enterprise survey in China(ES2012CN)by the World Bank Group,the method of"propensity score matching(PSM)"is applied to measure the micro(enterprise)and macro(region/industry)effects of rent-seeking regulation,and thus the"Simpson paradox"of rent-seeking effects can be verified quantitatively.This phenomenon can be explained economically from the perspective of the negative externality of rent-seeking regulation,and has significant policy implications.