考虑断链风险的供应链绩效测度与Nash谈判

Supply chain performance measurement and Nash bargaining considering the risk of chain break

供应链的任何局部变化都将影响整体绩效.准确评估系统的绩效水平是应对断链风险、提高其稳定性的基础.通过回顾三类常见的绩效测度,指出现有的测度不适用于面临断链风险的供应链.在区分中间产品和外向产出对上游绩效影响的基础上,提出新的供应链绩效测度,并论证了其对于识别断链情形的有效性.基于新的测度,进一步探讨供应链的绩效分配问题.围绕安全库存的建立,研究了上下游在应对断链风险的情况下如何实现效益共享.采用Nash谈判法分别对集权系统的绩效分配和分权系统的绩效谈判进行分析.研究表明,分权供应链通过Nash谈判能够实现集权模式下的最优.算例分析进一步验证了相关结论.其结果显示,安全库存的设置使上游避免因断链而绩效归零,同时可以改进下游绩效从而提高需求的稳定性.

Any local change in supply chains will affect the overall performance.An accurate performance evaluation of the system is the basis to deal with the risk of chain break and improve its stability.The paper,through a review of three types of common performance measures,points out that the existing measures are not suitable for supply chains with the risk of chain break.Distinguishing the impacts of intermediate products and export-oriented outputs on the upstream performance,a new performance measure for supply chains is proposed and its effectiveness in identifying broken chains is demonstrated.Based on the new measure,the distribution of supply chain performance is further discussed.By establishing safety stocks in response to the risk of chain break,how the upstream and downstream realize benefit sharing is investigated.Nash bargaining method is employed to analyze the performance decomposition in the centralized system and the performance negotiation in the decentralized system.It is shown that the decentralized supply chain can achieve the centralized optimality through Nash bargaining.An illustrative example further verifies the relevant conclusions.The results show that the setting of safety stocks can prevent the upstream performance from declining to zero due to chain break,and that it can also improve the downstream performance so as to enhance the stability of demands.