期刊文献+

考虑上级政府参与的PPP项目监管策略研究 被引量:6

Study on Supervision Strategy of PPP Project Considering the Participation of Higher-Level Government
原文传递
导出
摘要 在PPP项目中,社会资本的投机行为将损害公众利益,甚至影响项目的成功。因此,有必要建立适当的监督制度,以抑制社会资本的投机行为。但是,监管机制不一定都是有效的,考虑到政府和社会资本的成本效益及感知偏差,往往会出现激励悖论导致监管无效的可能。因此本文基于前景理论和有限理性假设,引入上级政府部门的行政监管机制,构建地方政府和社会资本的博弈收益感知矩阵,并基于该矩阵对博弈双方的行为进行演化博弈分析,为抑制PPP项目社会资本投机行为提出建议。研究表明,上级政府部门参与PPP项目监管对抑制社会资本投机行为有显著的提升作用;提高项目基本绩效标准参考点、增大项目的惩罚系数和提升上级政府部门监管概率可以达到抑制社会资本投机行为的目的。社会资本努力运营项目的奖励系数、地方政府监管成本和上级政府部门对地方政府的政治绩效惩罚对于抑制社会资本投机行为的作用根据项目初始条件的不同而不同。根据项目初始条件制定不同的监管策略,将有利于PPP项目监管体系的完善,促进PPP项目的可持续发展。 In PPP projects,investor speculation will damage the public interest and even affect the success of the project.Therefore,many government regulatory structures have been studied.However,considering the cost-effectiveness and perception bias of the government and investors,there is often the possibility that the incentive paradox will lead to invalid supervision.It is necessary to consider third parties from outside the regulatory structure to achieve effective regulation.Therefore,based on the prospect theory and the assumption of bounded rationality,the game revenue perception matrix is established and analyzed which introduces the administrative supervision mechanism of higher-level government departments.This can provide a theoretical basis for strategies to suppress speculation by investors in PPP projects.Studies have shown that the participation of higher-level government departments in the supervision of PPP projects has a significant effect on curbing investor speculation.Increasing the reference point of the project’s basic performance standards,the penalty factor of the project,and the supervision probability of higher-level government departments can achieve the purpose of suppressing investor speculation.The effects of reward coefficients,local government supervision costs,and local government political performance penalties on suppressing investor speculation vary according to the initial project conditions.Formulating different supervision strategies according to the initial conditions of the project will facilitate the improvement of the PPP project supervision system and promote the sustainable development of the PPP project.
作者 周亦宁 刘继才 ZHOU Yi-ning;LIU Ji-cai(School of Business,Jiangnan University,Wuxi 214122,China;School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSCD 北大核心 2023年第2期84-94,共11页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571149)。
关键词 PPP 政府监管 前景理论 演化博弈 PPP project government supervision mechanism prospect theory evolutionary game theory
  • 相关文献

参考文献10

二级参考文献102

共引文献266

同被引文献97

引证文献6

二级引证文献1

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部