矿业遗迹旅游开发监管的演化博弈与稳定性分析

Evolutionary Game and Stability Analysis of Mining Heritage Tourism Development Supervision

矿业遗迹旅游开发涉及主体众多,均衡各方主体利益对兼顾矿业遗迹保护和开发具有重要意义。文章搭建企业、政府和矿区居民三方核心利益主体的静态演化博弈模型,并在静态演化博弈基础上引入动态变量,利用系统动力学仿真分析三方在一般惩罚、动态惩罚与优化动态奖惩三种方案下的行为策略及稳定情况,并采用李雅普诺夫稳定性理论进行双重论证。研究发现:一般惩罚与动态惩罚方案下三方行为均不稳定,但动态惩罚方案在一定程度上能够抑制三方行为的波动情况;优化动态奖惩方案能够有效抑制三方行为的反复波动并达到理想的稳定状态。基于研究结论,文章提出政府应采取综合优化动态奖惩方案规制矿业遗迹再开发;设计各类政府监管工具组合拳、构建矿业遗迹开发生态文化体系与培育生态文化框架等建议。

The Shougang Ski Jumping Stadium,known as the“Flying Snow Sky”,was unexpectedly“out of the loop”at the Beijing Winter Olympics,highlighting the unique charm of the industrial relic.China has a long history of mining development,and the development of mineral resources has left environmental scars while bringing glory.How can ecological flowers blossom from mining scars?There are many actors involved in the development of mining heritage tourism,and balancing the interests of all actors is crucial to the conservation and development of mining heritage.How can incentives,rewards and penalties be designed to reconcile the rights and interests of multiple parties,thereby realizing the multiple economic,ecological and social benefits of mining heritage?Existing research has focused on the study of the use/direction of abandoned mine rehabilitation,the application of PPT projects,the study of the evolution of multiple subjects,and case studies.While evolutionary games are widely used to analyse the behaviour of multiple actors,there is a lack of research on the evolutionary games of stakeholders involved in the development of mining heritage tourism,and there is a lack of research on the dynamic evolution of multiple actors.The article explores the game and stability analysis of the government,enterprises and mining residents from the perspective of mining heritage tourism using the dynamic evolutionary approach,and explores the influence of government incentives on the development behaviour of enterprises from static to dynamic,in order to provide some reference for the government to optimise the regulatory mechanism.Firstly,a static evolutionary game model of the core interests of enterprises,government and mining residents is constructed;secondly,dynamic variables are introduced on the basis of the static evolutionary game,and system dynamics simulation is used to analyse the behavioural strategies and stability of the three parties under the three escalation schemes of general punishment,dynamic punishment and optimised dynamic reward and punishment,and Liapunov’s stability theory is used for double argumentation.It is found that(1)the behaviour of the three parties under the general evolutionary scenario is unstable and unpredictable,and market regulation is difficult;(2)by linking the cost of government supervision,the fine for corporate violations with the probability of corporate violations,and setting the government dynamic supervision variables and dynamic punishment variables,the behaviour of the three parties under the dynamic punishment scheme is also unstable,but the dynamic punishment scheme suppresses the fluctuation situation of the behaviour of the three parties to a certain extent.This indicates that simply adjusting the government supervision cost and dynamic punishment variables cannot effectively promote enterprises’law-abiding development,and further optimisation of the government supervision mechanism is required;(3)on the basis of introducing the government dynamic supervision cost and focusing on optimising the government dynamic punishment and incentive instruments,the further optimised dynamic reward and punishment scheme can effectively suppress the repeated fluctuations of tripartite behaviour and reach a stable state,proving the effectiveness of the incentive instruments in regulating enterprises’integrity.This demonstrates the effectiveness of incentives in regulating business integrity strategies.Finally,the article proposes that the government should adopt a comprehensive and optimized dynamic reward and punishment scheme to regulate the redevelopment of mining relics,collaborate with the public to build a combination of various regulatory tools,construct an ecological culture system and cultivate an ecological cultural framework for the development of mining relics.The article reveals the evolutionary differences between the three subjects in different contexts from a dynamic perspective.The dynamic non-linear punishment-subsidy mechanism provides a dynamic perspective on the complex interactions between the three subjects,offering a new explanation for the development of mining relics and enriching the approach to the study of tourism development of mining relics.However,the article defines mining residents as the supervisors of mining heritage tourism development,but in fact,mining residents have a dual role as both supervisors and participants of mining heritage tourism development,and their dual role increases the complexity of their interests and behavioural choices,which can be further expanded in future studies.The research can also be combined with surveys and interviews of actual mining heritage development cases to further consider the consistency with real cases and enhance the explanatory power of the research.