众包竞赛的最优加价延期策略

Optimal Mark-up Delay Strategy for Crowdsourcing Contests

众包竞赛的加价延期机制可被竞赛组织者作为激励参赛者提高努力的一种策略,本文引入加价延期概率、加价敏感度等参数,建立了包含组织者和同质参赛者的数学模型,对加价延期竞赛中的参赛者均衡和组织者决策进行了研究。本文分析了组织者无需加价延期和实行加价延期的前置条件,探讨了最优奖金策略和最优加价方式。结果显示:在参赛者对加价延期的概率持有较高期望时,组织者无需加价延期;在任务复杂度较低,或是参赛者加价敏感度较高时,实行加价延期能使组织者利润增加;最优奖金值关于任务复杂度、新颖性单调递增,最优奖金分配是赢者通吃,最优加价方式是一步加价。本文采用算例验证了相关结论,研究成果丰富了众包竞赛的理论研究,并对加价延期竞赛中组织者决策具有指导意义。

The mark-up delay mechanism of crowdsourcing contests can be used by organizers as a strategy to encourage contestants to improve efforts,this paper establishes a mathematical model which includes an organizer and homogeneous contestants,by introducing parameters such as probability of mark-up delay and sensitivity to mark-up,and studies the balance among contestants and decision-making of the organizer.This paper analyzes pre-conditions where the organizer does not need mark-up delay and where the organizer conducts it,and discusses the optimal incentive strategies of prize and mark-up method.The results show that the organizer does not need mark-up delay when contestants hold high expectation of the probability of it;conducting mark-up delay can increase the organizer’s profit when the task is less complex,or contestants’sensitivity is high;the optimal prize increases in task complexity and novelty,and the optimal prize allocation is winner-take-all,and the optimal mark-up method is one-step.By using numerical examples,this paper verifies relevant conclusions,which enrich the theoretical research of crowdsourcing contests and guide the decision-making of organizers in mark-up delay contests.