银行融资下中小企业保险购买决策研究

Credit Insurance Decision Analysis of SMEs under Bank Financing

本文考虑了一个由制造商(中小型企业)、银行以及保险公司构成的供应链金融系统,并在传统银行融资、保费外生以及保费内生三种供应链金融模式下探讨了有限信贷与信用保险对制造商生产运营决策产生的影响。研究发现,信用保险能够有效缓解有限信贷对制造商的融资限制,并降低制造商所面临的市场风险。然而,信用保险模式相对于传统银行融资模式而言并非是完全占优的,例如,在保费外生情形下,过高的保险费率将迫使制造商放弃信用保险以避免高额保费成本。研究表明,相对于保费外生模式,保费内生模式下制造商高额度的投保行为更难以缓解市场风险,这给制造商带来的管理学启示是:制造商在保费内生模式下进行过高的信用保险投保意义较小,即制造商只需要将投保额度设定在能够使银行放宽贷款限额至满足最优生产产量的水平上。

This paper considers a supply chain financing system composed of a manufacturer(SMEs),a bank and an insurance company,and discusses the influence of limited credit and credit insurance on the manufacturer’s production and operation decisions under three supply chain financing modes:traditional bank financing,exogenous premium and endogenous premium.We find that credit insurance can effectively alleviate the financing defects of limited credit and reduce the market risk faced by the manufacturer.However,the credit insurance model is not completely superior to the traditional bank financing model.For example,in the case of exogenous premium,the excessively high premium rate will force the manufacturer to abandon the credit insurance to avoid the high premium cost.Our study shows that,compared with the exogenous premium model,it is more difficult for the manufacturer to mitigate market risks under the endogenous premium model.The management implications are that it is meaningless for the manufacturer to carry out excessive credit insurance under the endogenous premium mode,the manufacturer simply need to set the insured amount at a level that will allow the bank to relax loan limit to meet normal production.