破坏性创新下考虑参照依赖的供应链合作研发决策研究

Research on Supply Chain Cooperative R&D Decision Considering Reference Dependence Under Destructive Innovation

基于破坏性创新,考虑参照依赖,构建供应链上下游企业合作研发决策的动态演化博弈模型,考虑低端市场入侵和新市场入侵2种不同类型破坏性创新,研究技术难度差异、感知收益和内部激励对供应链合作研发决策的影响,并以一拖集团与常州天发公司合作为例,进行数值仿真验证。研究结果表明:针对低端市场入侵和新市场入侵开展破坏性创新的技术难度差异越小,创新成本差异越小,供应链合作研发稳定性越强;合作研发与不合作研发的感知收益差距越大,供应链企业积极参与合作研发的可能性越大;合适范围的内部激励对维护稳定的合作关系有积极作用,但过高的内部激励可能成为企业负担。研究不仅能丰富破坏性创新和供应链合作研发研究,还能为供应链上下游企业合作研发决策提供指导。

Based on destructive innovation and the theory of reference-dependent,the paper builds a dynamic evolutionary game model to explores selections of cooperative R&D strategies among upstream and downstream companies in the supply chain,and considers the influences on supply chain cooperative R&D strategy choices from the aspects of the difference in technical difficulty of destructive innovations in new and low markets,the perceived value of cooperative R&D and non-cooperative R&D internal incentives.Finally,this article takes the example of YTO group’s cooperation with Changzhou Tianfa to perform numerical simulation verification.The research results showed as follows:The smaller the difference in technical difficulty between low-end market invasion and new market invasion,the smaller the difference in innovation cost,and the stronger the stability of supply chain cooperation R&D;The greater the perceived benefit gap between cooperative R&D and non-cooperative R&D,the greater the possibility of supply chain enterprises actively participating in cooperative R&D.Internal incentives at the right range can have a positive effect on maintaining stable partnerships,but excessive internal incentives can be a burden on businesses.This research can not only enrich disruptive innovation and supply chain cooperative R&D research,but also provide guidance for cooperative R&D decision-making of upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain.