基于政府与矿企协同监管演化博弈研究

Research on Evolutionary Game of Cooperative Supervision between Government and Mining Enterprises

运用基于传统博弈理论的有限理性模式下矿山企业和政府之间的演化博弈方法,研究矿山企业的安全投资策略与政府的安全监管策略之间的关系,并验证模型结果的有效性,以加强政府监管力度,提高政府监察机构效率,提高政府帮扶资金,降低矿山企业监管成本。研究发现,矿山企业与政府监察机构在矿山监察过程中,选择合作监察的概率会随着整体成本投入的增加而减少;矿山企业与政府监察机构在违约下的投入成本越高,选择合作的概率越大;矿山企业与政府监察机构通过矿山监察所获得的额外收益越高,选择合作的概率越大;矿山监察情况下,政府监察机构对矿山监察设备购入规模越大,双方选择合作的概率越大;非合作情况下,政府监察机构对矿山监察设备购入规模越大,双方选择合作的概率越小;矿山企业与政府监察机构放弃矿山监察所产生的违约金越高,双方选择合作的概率越大。结果表明,运用有限理性下的演化博弈方法可以得到矿山企业在多种合作意愿下的成本追加与投入,以及在矿山监察情境下的矿山安全服务企业能够额外获得多少收益会影响矿山企业与政府监察机构的合作意向。

Using the evolutionary game method between mining enterprises and the government under the incomplete rational model based on the traditional game theory,this paper studies the relationship between the safety investment strategy of mining enterprises and the safety supervision strategy of the government,verifies the effectiveness of the model results so as to strengthen government supervision,improves the efficiency of government supervision institutions,improve government support funds,and reduce the cost of mining enterprise supervision.It is found that the probability of cooperative supervision between mining enterprises and government supervision agencies in the process of mine supervision decreases with the increase of overall cost input;The higher the input cost of mining enterprises and government supervision institutions under default,the greater the probability of cooperation;The higher the additional income obtained by mining enterprises and government supervision agencies through mine supervision,the greater the probability of cooperation;In the case of mine supervision,the larger the government supervision organization purchases the mine supervision equipment,the greater the probability that both parties will choose to cooperate;In case of non cooperation,the larger the government supervision organization purchases the mine supervision equipment,the smaller the probability that both parties choose to cooperate;The higher the liquidated damages caused by the abandonment of mine supervision by mining enterprises and government supervision institutions,the greater the probability that both parties will choose to cooperate.The results indicate that the evolutionary game method under incomplete rationality can be used to study the cost addition and investment of mining enterprises under a variety of cooperation intentions,and how much additional income the mining safety service enterprises can obtain under the mine supervision situation can affect the cooperation intentions of mining enterprises and government supervision institutions.