“招商引资”政策与企业实际税率关系研究

Research on the Relationship Between the Policy of“Attracting Business and Investment”and the Effective Tax Rate of Enterprises

中国地方政府的锦标赛考核机制促进经济持续增长已被社会各界所广泛认同。但是,有关区域经济增长与企业实际税率呈现“剪刀差”的现象却仍然是一个谜。本文提出研究假设认为:不同地方政府的“招商引资”政策对当地企业的实际税率具有不同的影响机制。基于此,本文对企业依据实际税率展开迁移的内在逻辑做了理论推导,并分析了地方政府通过“招商引资”政策与企业的博弈。文章选取中国省级面板数据,对经济增长与企业实际税率的关系做了实证研究,同时对二者之间的关系进行了脉冲响应冲击分析,得出结论:(1)中国不同区域的经济增长对当地企业实际税率具有不同的影响,东部与中部地区的地方政府在能够完成经济增长的考核时期,放松对企业税收的征管力度,进而降低企业实际税率,反之则通过“足额”或“超额”征收的方式提升企业实际税率;(2)地方政府的“招商引资”政策能否降低企业实际税率,仍取决于其是否完成锦标赛的绩效,企业通过“招商引资”政策开展向经济发展落后地区迁移,在承受实际税率提升的同时,利用土地升值来扩充其利润增长。最后,得出相关启示:应充分考虑通过税务征收的垂直管理,规范地方政府税收征管口径的波动问题,这样才能有效释放减税红利;通过规范“招商引资”的税收优惠政策,来杜绝以土地赚利润的企业迁移行为,引导以发展促引资的地方政府考核导向。

The championship assessment mechanism of promoting the sustainable growth of economy of the Chinese local governments has been widely recognized by all sectors of society.However,it is still a mystery for the phenomena regarding the regional economic growth and the effective tax rate of enterprises demonstrate the“Price Scissors”.In order to research the restraining mystery for the economic growth of China to the effective tax rate of enterprises,this paper performs the theoretical derivation to the migratory internal logic carried out by the enterprises according to the effective tax rate,as well as analyzes the Game of local governments with enterprises through the the policies for“inviting outside investment”.The paper selects the provincial panel data of China to perform the empirical research to the relationship between economic growth and effective tax rate of enterprises,as well as performs the pulse response impact analysis to the relationship between them.The conclusion is made as below:(1)The regional economic growth of China restrains the effective tax rate of enterprises,in the assessment period when the local governments in eastern and central regions are able to achieve the economic growth,they will loosen the tax collection and management strength so as to reduce the effective tax rate of enterprises,otherwise enhance the effective tax rate of enterprises by the means of“full amount”or“excessive amount”.Under the restraints of migration cost,the enterprises passively accept the fluctuation of tax collection and management strength under the performance assessment mechanism of local governments;(2)Whether the policies for“inviting outside investment”of local governments can reduce the effective tax rate of enterprises still depends on whether they are able to fulfill the performance of championship.The enterprises carry out the migration to the economically underdeveloped areas through the policies for“inviting outside investment”.Along with bearing the enhancement of effective tax rate,they will expand their profit increase through acquiring the land upvaluation.Finally,it is able to conclude the relevant revelations:the central government needs to fully consider regulating the fluctuation issue for the tax collection and management requirements of local governments through the vertical management of tax collection so that it is able to effectively release the tax deductible bonus.Through regulating the tax preference policies for“inviting outside investment”,it is able to completely eradicate the migration behavior of making profits with the land for the enterprises so as to guide the assessment orientation of developing the promotion of inviting outside investment for the local governments.