社会资本的公司治理效应——来自公司高管本土化与会计信息质量关系的经验证据

Corporate governance effect of social capital:Empirical evidence from the relationship between localization of corporate executives and accounting information quality

在我国,企业普遍采用关系型交易的商业模式.不同于市场型交易,关系型交易不依赖法律等公共治理机制,而是依据交易特征来选择适宜的私人治理机制.本文分析认为,高管的本地社会资本具有显著的私人治理效应:本地高管为了维系和发展其社会资本,会更加关注公司的长期收益,进而制约自身的机会主义行为.本文预期,当高管籍贯地与公司所在地一致时,公司的会计信息质量更好.以我国资本市场1972家上市公司2000年—2015年数据作为样本进行检验,结果表明,相比于非本土高管,本土高管所在的公司具有更少的非正常应计项目、更低的财务舞弊和报表重述概率;进一步的分析表明,当高管更加注重承担社会责任、公司所在地区的社会资本紧密度更高、公司具有更高比例的本地利益相关者、公司为非国有企业或家族企业时,上述关系更为显著.本研究表明,在关系型社会中,高管的社会资本具有公司治理效应,可提升公司的会计信息质量.

Firms in China generally adopt the business model of relational transaction.Different from market transactions,relational transactions rely on appropriate private governance mechanisms according to transaction characteristics,instead of public governance mechanisms such as laws.This paper argues that the social capital of executives has a significant private governance effect:Local executives will pay more attention to long-term benefits and will restrict their opportunistic behaviors in order to maintain and develop social capital.This paper predicts that the quality of accounting information will be better when executives’native place is the same as the company’s location.Based on data of 1972 listed companies in China from 2000 to 2015,the results show that compared with non-local executives,local executives’companies have fewer abnormal accruals and lower probability of financial fraud and restatement.Further analysis shows that this correlation is more significant when executives are more focused on social responsibility,or the company is located in a region with a higher degree of social capital,or the company has a higher proportion of local stakeholders,or the company is non-state-owned or family-owned.This study shows that in a relational society,the social capital of executives has a corporate governance effect and can improve the quality of accounting information.