摘要
在《判断力批判》中,康德提出并讨论了“天才”与约束天才的“鉴赏”这一对概念。然而二者间存在一种微妙的张力,仅凭康德文本的字面意思去理解天才为何需要被约束、鉴赏如何约束天才,则会分裂二者,产生矛盾。但依据更广阔的语境,“天才”和“鉴赏”的含义完全可以扩展到彼此之中,使得二者成为同一原则——想象力对知性超越与再和谐——的两个侧面。这样的扩展不仅解决了康德天才理论的内在张力,也更加符合艺术发展的现实。
In Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant raised the concept of genius and taste, which serves as the constraint of genius. But there is a subtle tension between them. Why genius needs to be constrained and how taste works? If these questions are understood superficially, then these two concepts will be in conflict with each other. In line with a wider context of Kant, these two concepts can be extended into each other and become two facets of one principle, namely imagination’s transcendence and reconciliation of understanding. With such an extension, the tension between genius and taste could be mitigated and the accordance with facts of artistic development could be established.
出处
《理论界》
2023年第1期88-94,共7页
Theory Horizon