高管激励体系的有效性研究——基于企业战略视角

Research on the Effectiveness of Executive Incentive System:Based on the Perspective of Enterprise Strategy

高管薪酬激励体系一直是影响企业业绩的关键因素,现有文献缺乏从企业战略角度考察高管激励制度的有效性。利用2010—2019年中国A股上市企业数据作为研究样本,实证检验企业战略激进程度对高管激励体系的影响与内在机理。研究发现:企业战略越激进,高管货币薪酬与会计业绩的敏感性越低,而股权激励与市场业绩的敏感性越高;企业风险水平上升和委托代理冲突增加是激进型战略影响高管激励有效性的内在机制;通过改善内部控制质量和提高机构投资者持股比例能够缓解激进型战略对高管货币薪酬与会计业绩敏感性的抑制作用。文章丰富了高管薪酬契约有效性研究,为企业实施激进型战略时如何改善薪酬激励体系提供了新的启示。

The executive compensation incentive system has always been a key factor affecting the performance of enterprises.There is a lack of literature on the effectiveness of the executive incentive system from the perspective of corporate strategy.Using the data of China's A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019 as a research sample,this paper empirically tests the impact and internal mechanism of corporate strategic radicality on the executive incentive system.The study found that:the more aggressive the corporate strategy,the lower the sensitivity of executive monetary compensation and accounting performance,while the higher the sensitivity of equity incentives to market performance;the increase in corporate risk level and the increase in principal-agent conflicts are the reasons why aggressive strategies affect executive incentives.The internal mechanism of effectiveness;by improving the quality of internal control and increasing the shareholding ratio of institutional investors,the inhibitory effect of aggressive strategies on the sensitivity of executive monetary compensation and accounting performance can be alleviated.This article enriches the research on the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts,and provides new inspiration for how to improve the compensation incentive system when companies implement aggressive strategies.