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知行转换视角下水利工程精细化管理推进机制研究 被引量:1

Study on the promotion mechanism of fine management of hydraulic engineering from the perspective of transformation of knowledge and practice
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摘要 精细化管理能有效保证水利工程安全、健康、高效运行,是水利工程发展的必然趋势,但水利工程精细化管理推行过程中普遍存在知行偏差问题。从知行转换视角出发,在梳理水利工程精细化管理特点的基础上,从个体和组织两个层面分析了水利工程精细化管理知行转换偏差的成因,利用动因理论和计划行为理论,遵循“行为意向影响因素—行为意向—行为”的逻辑分析了知行转换的内在机理,构建了“利益、激励约束、绩效评价和协同”四位一体的水利工程精细化管理推进机制总体框架,并结合水利工程管理体制与机制特点,对4个机制的运行展开了探讨。研究结果表明:利益机制是精细化管理知行转换的内驱力,运行内容主要包括利益诉求信息的收集处理、合理利益诉求的满足和各方利益合理诉求的引导等;激励约束机制是精细化管理知行转换的外驱力,由于精细化管理自上而下行政推动的特性,其运行方式需从组织和个体两个层面考虑;评价机制是激励约束机制的前置环节,同时也是精细化管理知行转换的外驱力,运行主体内容包括结果或成效端口和管理要素端口两部分;协同机制是精细化管理知行转换的重要保障,包括外部政产学研协同和内部“三全育人”协同两个层面。 Fine management can effectively ensure the safe,healthy and efficient operation of water conservancy projects,which is the inevitable trend of the development of water conservancy projects.However,there is a common problem of knowledge and practice deviation in the implementation of fine management of water conservancy projects.From the perspective of knowledge and practice conversion,on the basis of sorting out the characteristics of fine management of water conservancy projects,this paper explores the causes of the deviation of knowledge and practice conversion in the fine management of water conservancy projects from the individual and organizational levels,and analyzes the internal mechanism of the transformation of knowledge and practice by using the theory of motivation and the theory of planned behavior,following the logic of“influencing factors of behavior intention-behavior intention-behavior”,and constructs the overall framework of the fine management promotion mechanism of water conservancy projects integrating interests,incentive constraints,evaluation and synergy mechanisms,and discusses the operation of the four mechanisms by combining with the characteristics of the water conservancy project management system.The results show that the interest mechanism is the internal driving force for the transformation of knowledge and action in refined management,and the operation content mainly includes the collection and processing of interest appeal information,the satisfaction of reasonable interest claims,and the guidance and debugging of reasonable interests of all parties.The incentive and constraint mechanism is the external driving force for the transformation of knowledge and action of refined management,and due to the top-down administrative promotion of refined management,its operation mode needs to be considered from both the organizational and individual levels.The evaluation mechanism is the precursor of the incentive and constraint mechanism,and it is also the external driving force for the transformation of refined management knowledge and action.The main content of operation includes two parts:result or effect port and management element port.The synergy mechanism is an important guaranteefor the transformation of refined management knowledge and action,including external government-industry-university-research collaboration and internal“three comprehensive education”collaboration.
作者 简迎辉 王可迎 沈菊琴 欧阳红祥 JIAN Yinghui;WANG Keying;SHEN Juqin;OUYANG Hongxiang(Business School,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China;College of Agricultural Science and Engineering,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China)
出处 《水利经济》 2023年第2期41-46,94,95,共8页 Journal of Economics of Water Resources
基金 江苏省水利科技项目(2022025)。
关键词 水利工程 精细化管理 知行转换 推进机制 计划行为理论 water conservancy project fine management transformation of knowledge and practice promoting mechanism theory of planned behavior
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