道德非认知主义的困境

The Difficulties of Moral Non-Cognitivism

元伦理学界通常认为道德非认知主义有两大理论吸引力:一是能解释道德判断与动机为何有着紧密联系,二是保持本体论上简洁。论证表明这两条都不成立。情绪表达与动机之间没有概念必然性,虽然情绪主义可以主张情绪与动机在心理学上存在紧密性,规范-表达主义可以主张有条件的概念必然性,但都难以将道德判断从非道德判断中鉴别出来。比约翰松与麦克弗森试图给出一个自然化解释:类别直觉有助于促进社会协作。论证表明道德判断的个体化不依赖判断的社会功能,比约翰松与麦克弗森的方案不成立。

Moral non-cognitivism has two attractions of theory in metaethics:On one hand,moral non-cognitivism can explain the intimate connection between moral judgement and motivation.On the other hand,moral non-cognitivism keeping the ontology simple.This paper argues that neither is true.The connection between emotion and motivation is not conceptual necessary.Though emotivism can claim that connection between emotion and motivation is mere psychologically intimate,norm-expressivism can explain its conceptual necessity,but they can't distinguish moral judgement from non-moral judgement.Bjornsson and McPherson attempt to explain it by a naturalized explanation,such as classificatory intuitions have been shaped to contribute to satisfy needs of social practicality.This paper argues that moral judgement individuation does not depend on social function of judgement,so Bjornsson and McPherson's plan is wrong.